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WHY ALL IS NOT QUIET ON THE "HOME FRONT" FOR
CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS
NINA J. CRLMM*
INTRODUCTION
All has been relatively quiet on the "home front" for nonprofit organizations for
many years. Historically, nonprofit organizations encountered challenges, for the
most part, from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) as it considered an
organization's initial application for tax-exempt status under Internal Revenue Code
(I.R.C.) § 501(a) or an organization's continued deservedness of tax-exempt status.
However, the formerly quiescent "home front" has awakened. Over the past twentyfive years, and in the last ten years in particular, a number of state and local activists
and politicians have called for reviews or studies or have enacted reforms of state
and local tax policies on exempting nonprofit organizations from taxation.1 State
and local tax authorities also have taken an increased interest in challenging
nonprofit organizations' tax-exempt status. Government officials, such as state

* Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law; A.B. Washington University (1972); J.D. and
M.B.A., Tulane University (1979); LL.M. in Taxation, Georgetown University Law Center (1982); author of TAX
COURT LITIGATION: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1992 & 1993 eds. & Supps. 1993-1998).
1. See Fred Stokfeld, ColoradoInitiative Would Repeal Nonprofits' Property Tax Initiative, 72 TAX
NOTES 1352 (1996); Thomas J. Billitteri, Rethinking Who Can Sue a Charity, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Mar. 12,
1998, at 1; Charity Careat State'sNonprofit HospitalsExceeds Estimated Tax Liability, Study Says, DAILY TAX
REP., (BNA) No. 103, at H-2 (May 29, 1998), available in WL, BNA-DTR File (recounting that Michigan's
Department of Treasury, in early 1997, scrutinized tax-exempt nonprofit hospitals at the state legislature's request);
Virginia Culver, Amendment to Tax ColoradoNonprofits Loses Big, DENVER POST, Nov. 6. 1996, at AAI,
available in 1996 WL 12635827; Governor Approves Uniform Standards for Charitable Property Tax
Exemptions, DAILY TAX REP., (BNA) No. 232, at H-1 (Dec. 3,1997), available in WI, BNA-DTR File (reporting
that Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge signed legislation on November 26, 1997, to clarify the standards that
nonprofit organizations must satisfy for tax exemption); Legislative Council to Study PropertyTax Reform Over
Interim, DAILY TAX REP., (BNA) No. 102, at H-I (May 28, 1997), available in WI, BNA-DTR File (indicating
that the North Dakota Legislative Council would study property tax reform over subsequent eighteen months);
Policies on Tax Exemptions for Nonprofit OrganizationsUnder Review, Official Says, DAILY TAX REP., (BNA)
No. 225, at H-2 (Nov. 21, 1997), available in W, BNA-DTR File (recounting that the District of Columbia is
reviewing and considering changing its policies providing Tax Exemptions for nonprofit organizations); Barbara
A. Simon, Colorado Debates Abolishing Tax exemption for Churches, FREEDOM WRITER, March 1996, at
http.//www.berkshire.net/-ifas fw/9603/legal.html; David Vise, Districtto Go After Tax-Exempt Groups: Fannie
Mae, Others Eyedfor Funds, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 25,1995, at Al, A7, availablein 1995 WL 2075049; Grant
Williams, New Pa. Law and Court Ruling Specify Standardsfor Tax Exemptions, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Dec.
11, 1997, at 41 (describing movement in Pennsylvania to reform tax exemption standards for charitable
organizations).
On the federal level, in the last several years politicians have reviewed, studied and reformed numerous
federal tax policies and laws affecting charitable organizations. See, e.g., Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No.
104-168, 110 Stat. 1452 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) (adding LR.C. § 4958 to impose
intermediate sanctions when I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) & (c)(4) organizations engage in an excess benefit transaction);
Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Oversight of the Comm. on Ways andMeans, 102nd Cong. (June 15,
1993 & Aug. 2, 1993), available in 1993 WL 760168, and HearingsBefore the House Subcomm. on Oversight
of the Comm on Ways and Means, 103rd Cong. (March 16, 1994), available in 1994 WL 224880 (hearings,
commonly called the "Pickle Hearings", investigating the federal tax laws applicable to tax-exempt charitable
organizations that included testimony implicating some charities in egregious behavior).
2. See Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of California, 204 Cal. App.3d 1269, 250 Cal.
Rptr. 891 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); Santa Catalina Island Conservancy v. County of Los Angeles, 178 Cal. Rptr. 708
(Cal. Ct. App. 1982); New Jersey Carpenters Apprentice Training and Educ. Fund v. Borough of Kenilworth, 685
A.2d 1309(NJ. 1996); Holy Spirit Ass'n v. Tax Comm'n, 438 N.Y.S.2d 521 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981), rev'd, 435
N.E. 2d 662 (N.Y. 1982); Hospital Utilization Project v. Commonwealth, 487 A.2d 1306 (Pa. 1985); Biosciences
Info. Serv. v. Commonwealth, 551 A. 2d 672 (Pa. Conunw. Ct. 1988); Baptist Mem'Is Geriatric Ctr. v. Tom Green
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attorneys general, appear to have an increased interest in promoting accountability
of nonprofit organizations, their trustees and officers.3 In some states, such as West
Virginia, the county or district attorney assumes this role. These government
officials appear increasingly ready to exercise their responsibilities for bringing
actions to protect the public interest in the charitable organization, including
supervising and enforcing interests in the organization's property and income
devoted to charitable purposes and assuring the proper execution of fiduciary
responsibilities of trustees and officers.4 Many indicators point to an awakening of
a previously "sleeping giant."
Economic conditions have contributed to the recent trend of exemption
challenges encountered by nonprofits. Federal revenues received by nonprofit
organizations declined during the 1980s and 1990s and budget projections show
further declines.5 The 1990-91 recession financially strained many state and local
governments, and motivated searches for new tax revenue sources.6 Municipalities
County Appraisal Dist., 851 S.W.2d 938 (rex. App. 1993); Dallas Symphony Ass'n., Inc. v. Dallas Co. Appraisal
Dist., 695 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. App. 1985); Lamb County Appraisal Dist. v. South Plains Hosp.-Clinic, Inc., 688
S.W.2d 896 (Tex. App. 1985); Yorgason v. County Bd. of Equalization ex rel. Episcopal Management Corp., 714
P.2d 653 (Utah 1986); Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 709 P.2d 265 (Utah 1985); see also Janne
G. Gallagher, When Local Governments Come Calling: The Movement to Tax Charities, 18 EXEMPT ORG. TAX
REV. 25 (1997) (surveying the tax-exempt debate with a state-by-state update); Gary Taylor, Hospital Sued in
Novel Lawsuit, NAT'L LAW J., Feb. 18, 1991, at 3 (discussing Texas v. Methodist Hosp., No. 494212 (Tex. Dist.
Ct. 1991)).
3. See James B. Lyon, The Supervision of Charities in the United States by the Attorneys General (and
Other State Agencies) and the Internal Revenue Service, in NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 24TH CONFERENCE ON TA
PLANNING FOR 501(C)(3) ORGANIZATIONS 5-1, 5-9 to -10, 5-25 to -30 (1996); Gallagher, supra note 2, at 25-26,
32-33. Statistical information is not available to indicate the apparent increase in interest by the state and local
authorities. Data has not been collected by the National Association of Attorneys General on the number of
investigations or cases brought in this area. However, the general sense is that interest has increased over the past
twenty-five years. See Lyon at 5-9 to -10. 5-25 to 5-30; Gallagher at 25-26
In most states, the attorney general has responsibility for overseeing and supervising charitable
corporations and trusts. See JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN ScHwARz, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 245 (1995).
State attorneys general can bring civil actions to remove directors and officers for self-dealing, waste, diversion
of a charitable organization's assets, or other breach of fiduciary duty. They can also attempt to cause an accounting
by a nonprofit organization of its assets or to dissolve a charitable corporation for ultra vires acts. However, they
do not have the power to manage the daily affairs of a charitable organization. See id. at 246-47; OFFICE OF THE
OHIO ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE STATUS OF STATE REGULATION OF CHARITABLE TRUSTS, FOUNDATIONS, AND
SOuCrIATIONS, in COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS, RESEARCH PAPERS [hereinafter
FILER COMM'N RESEARCH PAPERS RESEARCH PAPERS] 2705, 2710-25 (1977); Marion Fremont-Smith, Trends in
Accountability and Regulation of Nonprofits, in THE FUTURE OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 75, 75-76 (Virginia
Hodgkinson et al. eds., 1989); Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L REV.
497, 600-01 (1981); Kenneth L Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An Unfulfilled State
Responsibility, 73 HARVARD L REv. 433, 449-60 (1960).
Twenty-six states now have a specific person in the attorney general's office to monitor charitable
organizations. See Billitteri, supra note 1, at 35. Eleven of these states have two or more persons to monitor
charitable organizations on a full-time basis. See id.
4. See id.
5. See JUUAN WOLPERT, WHAT CHARITY CAN AND CANNOT DO: A TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND REPORT
12-13 (1997); VIRGINIA A. HODGKINSON ET AL, THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL BUDGET PROPOSALS UPON THE
ACTVrriEs OF CHARITABLE ORGANZATIONS AND THE PEOPLE THEY SERVE 7 (1995).
6. See Peter Durantine, Hart Standards;House Votes Next Week, HARRISBURG PATRIOT, Nov. 20, 1997,
at B3, availablein 1997 WL 7548786; Robert Franklin, Colorado Vote Could Prove Taxing for Nonprofits: A
Colorado Campaign to Extend PropertyTaxes to Nonprofits Raises Issues from Tax Relief to Bigotry and Has
Implicationsfor Other States, MINNEAPOLIS-ST.PAUL STAR-TRIBUNE, Nov. 3,1996, at 25A, availablein 1996 WL
6935071; Ralph Jimenez, Money Crunch Has Assessors Casting Eyes at Exempt Groups; The Scramble for Tax
Revenues Puts Some Groups in New Light, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 19,1992, at 13, availablein 1992 WL 4172109;
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also have faced tax base erosion as a result of the flight of businesses and residents
to outlying areas.7 Meanwhile, public outcries against higher property and income
taxes have strengthened, and voters have opposed proposed measures to increase
taxes.' These financially strapped state and local governments have targeted
nonprofits as one means of resolving their pinched monetary and tax base
dilemmas. 9
Although tax revenues have risen in the past several years for many state and
local governments,' ° challenges to nonprofit organizations have continued and
grown in regularity." This article explores non-economic considerations as well as
economic forces that may have contributed to nonprofits' vulnerability to attack.
The article suggests that economic stresses have not been the exclusive cause for
heightened concerns demonstrated by state, and local authorities with respect to
nonprofit charitable organizations. The additional factors include: (a) the exercise
of expanded monitoring functions by state and local officials as part of a

Steve Marantz, Boston Rethinking Exemption: Nonprofits' Funds Soughtfor City, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 4, 1991,
at 13, available in 1991 WL 7400162; Brooke A. Masters, Judge Stops College's Tax Exemption; Pennsylvania
Court Questions Nonprofit School's Charitable Function, WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 18, 1994, at A9, available
in 1994 WL 2435393; John Ramsey & Carol Shattuck, Threats to Nonprofits are Gathering on the Horizon,
HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 18, 1997, at 21, available in 1997 WL 13073497.
7. See WILLAM G. COLMAN, CITIES, SUBURBS AND STATES; GOVERNING AND FINANCING URBAN AMERICA
41-44 (1975); JON C. TEAFORD, POST-SUBURBIA: GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS AT THE EDGE OF CITIES 96 (1997);
Peter Mieszkowski & E.S. Mills, The Causes ofMetropolitan Suburbanization, J. ECON. PERSPECrwVES, Summer
1993, at 135-47; Charlie Cain & Mark Hornbeck, Detroit's Population Drop: If Residents Fall Below 1 Million,
1.5% Tax Paid By Suburbanites Would Become Illegal, DETROIT NEWS, Nov. 19, 1997, at Al, available in 1997
WL 5604621; Royal Ford & Rachel Collins, Boomtown Moves to the Country; City Families Seek Quieter
Lifestyle, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 16, 1997, at Al, available in 1997 WL 6280553; John Schmeltzer, When
Businesses Take Their Plants to Suburbs, Society Can Pay Big Bills, UIC Study Suggests More Use of Abandoned
City Industrial Sites, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Sept. 15, 1996, at 1,available in 1996 WL 2708562; Tim Schreiner &
Ramon G. McLeod, Suburbs Big Winners in Census Cities Continue to Decline, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Jan.
25, 1991, at A 1,available in 1991 WL 4171755; James Tobin, Suburb's Population Growth is Detroit's Loss,
DETROIT NEWS, Sept. 2, 1993, at A2, available in 1993 WL 6051486. See generally ANTHONY DOWNS, NEW
VISIONS FOR METROPOLITAN AMERICA (1994) (analyzing problems that growth creates and focusing on regional
and metropolitan solutions).
8. See Lee Berton, Roll Call: Towns Fightfor Right to Tax Some Property of Nonprofit Groups, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 14, 1994, at Al, available in 1994 WL-WSJ 2056625; Elsa Brenner, Priests and Town Battle Over
Business Zone and Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1997, at WC1,available in 1997 WL 8012181; Carey Goldberg,
In the "Live Free or Die" State, An Unpalatable Tax Decision, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1998, at Al, available in
1998 WL 5417132; Adam Pertnan, Colorado Initiative Targets Church Tax Exemption, BOSTON GLOBE, July 6,
1996, at 1,available in 1996 WL 6868335; see also infta note 38 and accompanying text (discussing California's
Proposition 13 and voter resistance to increased property taxes).
9. See Marantz,supra note 6, at 13; Julia McCord, A Taxing Issue, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Mar. 16,
1996, at 57, available in 1996 WL 6009588; Pertman, supra note 8, at 1; David A. Vise & Howard Schneider,
Barry's Cuts Win Praise in Congress; Control Board Leader Says US. Should Boost Funds by $100 Million,
WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 1996, at 1, available in 1996 WL 3069874. See also infra notes 32-47 and accompanying
text (discussing the financial pressures on governments).
10. See Elizabeth L Davis & Donald J. Boyd, The New Year Starts on a High Note, 32 STATE REVENUE
REP. 1, 1-3 (1998); Daniel Shaviro, An Economic and Political Look at Federalism in Taxation, 90 MICH. L REV.
895, 895 (1992) (stating that in the thirty years up to 1992, state and local tax receipts more than doubled in real
terms, increased relative to U.S. tax receipts and the gross national product); Pennsylvania Fiscal Year Ends With
Record Level of Revenue; New Fiscal Year Will Start With Unanticipated $111 Million Surplus, P.R. NEWSWIRE,
INC., June 30, 1990, <http'/biz.yahoo.compmews/980630/pa.revenue-l.html>.
11. See, e.g., Pinnacle Health Hosps. v. Dauphin County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 708 A.2d 1284 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1998) (reviewing the county's revocation of the tax-exempt status of the hospital); Unionville-Chadds
Ford Sch. Dist. v. Chester County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 692 A.2d 1136 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997) (deciding
on a challenge to a public garden's tax-exempt status).
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revitalization of federalism; (b) the efforts to direct funds to changing social needs;
(c) the nonprofits' own behaviors; (d) the distrust of federal oversight of nonprofits;
and (e) the growth and visibility of the nonprofit sector. Overall, this article alerts
scholars and practitioners that the tax-exempt status for nonprofits is no longer a
sacred topic. There is little to suggest that state and local tax authorities and
attorneys general will be quiescent in the near future.
I. FEDERALISM AND DECENTRALIZATION
The beginning point for understanding the changing landscape for nonprofits
requires an understanding of federalism. Federalism, which is at the core of this
country' s governmental structure, is based on the idea of decentralized authority.
Federalism has deep roots in American constitutional history. The Articles of
Confederation drafted in 1777 and ratified in 1781 reflected a mistrust of
centralized governmental power. The Articles created a league of friendship among
the states, which, while bound together as the United States, retained their
individual sovereignty and independence. There was no unifying law, aside from
an ineffective unicameral Congress, no single government and no established means
of preventing states from taking advantage of each other. As a result of the chaos
that resulted from nonunity, state delegates met in Philadelphia to remedy the
turmoil. The Philadelphia Constitutional Convention proposed a constitution that
created a national government with circumscribed powers; state sovereignties were
maintained as repositories for all powers not delegated to the national government.12
Concerns about the loss of state controls led to the proposal of the Bill of Rights to
avoid discord and to assure ratification of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights
protected numerous personal liberties from unwarranted intrusions by the national
government, reserved undelegated power to the people, and specifically reserved
to the states or the people all powers not specifically delegated in nor prohibited by
the Constitution to the national government. 3
The diffusion of the national focus has been cyclical. States have gained
preeminence, relatively recently, after a long period of federal expansion. 4 The ebb

12. See U.S. CONST. art. L § 8 (enumerating Congress' powers). The most prominent supporters of this
Constitution, known as Federalists, were James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, who together with John Jay
published eighty-five essays aimed to persuade ratification of the Constitution. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 17-20,
45-51 (Alexander Hamilton, James Madison & John Jay). Opponents, or Anti-Federalists, the most prominent of
whom was Samuel Adams, expressed concerns about the loss of state controls.
13. See U.S. CONST. amends. I-IV, IX, X; CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA 24448, 282-91 (1966); ARCHmALD COX, THE COURT AND THE CONSTrrTUTION 31-83 (1987); REX E. LEE, A LAWYER
LOOKS AT THE CONSTIrurON 17-31 (1981); JETHRO K. IEBERMAN, UNDERSTANDING OUR CONSTITUTION 140194 (1968); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 762-67 (1971); see also
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 568-69 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(quoting letter from Samuel Adams to Richard Henry Lee (Dec. 3, 1787)).
Some view federalism as a code for federal abdication. See Deborah Maranville, Welfare & Federalism,
36 LOYOLA L. REV. 1, 41 (1990); Harry N. Scheiber, Federalismand the Legal Process: Historical and
Contemporary Analysis of the American System, 14 L. & Soc'Y REV. 663, 690 (1980).
14. See U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERMENTAL RELATIONS, THE QUESTION OF STATE
CAPACITY 364 (1985) [hereinafter U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N]; Richard P. Nathan, Defining Modem Federalism,
in NORTH AMERICAN & COMPARATIVE FEDERALISM: ESSAYS FOR THE 1900S 89-93 (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 1992);
Frank J. Thompson, New FederalismandHealth Care Policy: States and the Old Questions, 11 J. HEALTH POL.,
POL'Y &L 647, 648-49, 664-65 (1986).
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and flow of federalism continues to be an important topic for scholars. 5 Case law
presents a historical tag for tracing the shift in federalism. For example, in 1985, the
United States Supreme Court overruled National League of Cities v. Usery,'6 with
Garciav. San Antonio Metropolitan TransitAuthority, 7 on the grounds that a state
employer's exemption capacity was not sheltered from the federal Fair Labor
Standards Act." This was followed in 1992, by the Court's decision in New York
v. United States,'9 which limited Congress' power to compel states to provide for
disposal of low level nuclear waste.2' Then, in 1997, the Court decided Printz v.
United States,2 which concluded that imposing the federal Brady Handgun
Violence Prevention Act on chief state law enforcement officers was
unconstitutional.22
There are many reasons for the establishment and encouragement of a
decentralized governmental system. They include: (a) avoiding excess concentration
of power in a central government by shifting power to state and local units; 23 (b)
enhancing the development of political responsibility and its potential for increasing
efficiency in government by benign competition and finding the appropriate level
of government for a particular task; 24 (c) encouraging local experimentation
and
26
innovation; 25 and (d) permitting adaptations to account for local needs.
The federal government has been a powerful source of control and funding for
many socially valued programs for most of this century. 27 After World War II, the

15. See generally FEDERALISM AND RIGHTs (E. Katz & G. Alan Tarr eds., 1996) (addressing moral
federalism, that regards federalism as contributing to and becoming a medium for individual contributions to a
democratic social and political order); Nathan, supra note 14, at 89-93 (discussing political federalism as perceived
by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and more modem approaches); Shaviro, supra note 10, at 895 (discussing
the expected expansion of state and local taxation and tax efficiency issues).
16. 426 U.S. 833 (1978).
17. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
18. See id. at 555-57.
19. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
20. See id. at 188.
21. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
22. See id. at 944-45.
23. James Madison presented the concept of duality of the state and federal government systems as a means
of a system of checks and balances for one another. See THE FEDERAUST No. 51, at 323 (James Madison)
(Arlington House, 1966); Nathan, supra note 14, at 91. Later the federal republic moved from Madisonian dual
federalism to cooperative federalism, with state and federal governments implementing the goals of one another
and assigning tasks to one another.
In recent years, the Supreme Court has asserted that federalism is not dead. See, e.g., Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 567 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("States' role in our
system of government is a matter of constitutional law, not of legislative grace."). See also Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898 (1997); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995);
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
24. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 934-35; New York, 505 U.S. at 149-181.
25. See PHnliP WEINBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw, CASES AND MATERiALS 394 (2d ed. 1998) ("It is one
of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may... serve as a laboratory; and try
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country." (citing New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))).
26. See GEORGE C. S. BENSON ET AL, THE AMERICAN PROPERTY TAX: rS HISTORY, ADMINISTRATION, AND
ECONOMIC IMPACr 1 (1965); COMPEmON AMONG STATES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: EFFICIENCY AND EQUrY
INAMERICAN FEDERALISM 119 (Daphne A. Kenyon & John Kincaid eds., 1991).
27. See, e.g., National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1750(1994); Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 303,
401-26 (1994); Grants to States for Aid and Services to Needy Families with Children and for Child Welfare
Services, 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1994); Maternal and Child Health Services Block Grant, 42 § U.S.C. 701-11 (1994);
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public demanded that Washington provide public assistance because the state and
local governments had become either dormant, indifferent or unable to provide the
needed resources. Efforts were made during President Eisenhower's administration
to restore some powers to states, but those efforts were not successful.
In the late 1960s, the federal government made some attempt to increase federalstate cooperation in a variety of areas.28 One such attempt was the Tax Reform Act
of 1969,29 which expanded the involvement of the IRS in policing public charities
and private foundations. The enactment of the private foundation provisions in one
sense represented a federal preemption of the acceptable means of operation by
private foundations. It also "established the groundwork for enforcement of the new
federal requirements at the state level.... mhe requirements of [Internal Revenue
Code] § 508(e) were specifically designed to encourage and facilitate effective state
involvement in the supervision of private foundations .... "'o
This dual regulatory system was designed to encourage the federal government's
regulation of the conduct of the private foundation through the imposition of
penalty taxes on unacceptable behaviors and the state governments' regulation of
private foundations' assets to assure their preservation for charitable purposes.3
The enactment in 1969 of I.R.C. § 6104(c)(1), 32 which requires the IRS to notify
appropriate state officials of its refusal to grant or its revocation of a nonprofit
organization's tax-exempt status,33 reaffirmed the duality of the federal-state system.
At the same time, it weakly promoted the opportunity for state attorneys general to
actively and positively enforce state tax exemption criteria and asset preservation

Nathan, supra note 14,at 93.
28. Urban renewal, technology, coastal management, clean water and environmental programs were just
a few of the areas in which federal-state cooperation was attempted, much of which was implemented through
federal grants-in-aid. See NORMAN BECKMAN, CHANGING GOVERNMENTAL ROLES INURBAN DEVELOPMENT,
SHAPING AN URBAN FUTURE: ESSAYS INMEMORY OF CATHERINE BAUERWURSTER 154-57 (1969); MICHAEL E.
LEVY & JUAN DE TORRES, NATIONAL INDUS. CONFERENCE BD., INC., FEDERAL REVENUE SHARING WITH THE
STATES, STUDIES INBUSINESS ECONOMICS, NO. 114 (1970); NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION & STATE JOINT
EFFORTS, SCIENCE FOR SOCIETY: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL SCIENCE CONFERENCE HELD AT ATLANTA,
GEORGIA I (John E. Mock ed., 1970); WALLACE OATS, STUDIES IN FISCAL FEDERALSM 181 (1991) (federal
grants-in-aid to states rose from $7 billion in 1960 to $2.2 billion in 1970). See also supra note 23 (discussing
James Madison's concept of duality of federal-state responsibilities).
29. Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 101, 83 Stat. 487 (1969) [hereinafter TRA of 1969] (enacting, within its
provisions, I.R.C. §§ 508-09 and §§ 4941-45).
30. Marion R. Fremont-Smith, Impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 on State Supervision of Charities,
8 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 537, 542 (1971).
31. See id. at 540-42. Moreover, because the TRA of 1969 did not cover public charities in the penalty tax
provisions of I.R.C. §§ 4941-45, the need for state regulation of and enforcement with respect to these nonprofit
organizations remained.
32. See TRA of 1969, § 101(e)(2).
33. See Fremont-Smith, supra note 30, at 553-54. It was reported that in 1973, the IRS provided 7800
notices of termination of the federal income tax exemptions of public charities, but only three states asked to
inspect the IRS materials. See Donald C. Alexander, Comm'r of the I.R.S., Speech Before the Special
Subcommittee on Charitable Trusts and Solicitations of the National Association of Attorneys General (Jan. 1974).
In the 1970s, the IRS was making approximately 20,000 tax exemption determinations annually. See James
Abernathy & Timothy Saasta, Everything You Wanted to Ask About the IRS But Were Afraid to Know,
GRANTSMANSHIP CENTER NEWS, 1977, at 29. In fiscal year 1973, the IRS audited 14,958 private foundations, 2046
other I.R.C. § 501(cX3) organizations and 1976 organizations in other tax-exempt categories. See id. at 31. In that
same year, approximately 2.5% of the 80,000 public charities that filed returns were audited, of which
approximately 1-2% led to proposed revocations of tax-exempt status and an unknown number led to modifications
in status. See id. at 32.
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standards based on information received from the federal government.' Assistant
Commissioner of the IRS for Employee Plans and Exempt Organization, Alvin D.
Lurie commented at the time:
Within that broad and fundamental statement of our philosophy we see our
regulatory powers as inextricably entwined with those of the states. The Internal
Revenue Service makes tax exemption determinations, and monitors compliance
with them. However, when a violation is discovered, the ability to invoke the
jurisdiction of an equity court, with its broad and adaptable powers, is uniquely
the province of the states. Only in certain limited circumstances can the Service
take all of the steps necessary fully to protect the public....
Under that section [I.R.C. § 6104(c)], our obligation is to let the state know
whenever we have taken an adverse action against a public charity, or whenever
we have determined to impose an excise tax or a penalty on a private
foundation.... The state's role, as the statutory scheme contemplates in a
private foundation case where correction remains outstanding, is to bring about
"correction." The state alone can do this through the exercise of state equity
powers.35
Thus, even within the confines of the tax laws as applied to public charities and
private foundations, stricter overall federal controls and weak state involvement
marked the late 1960s.
This trend continued in the early 1970s. The enactment in 1972 of federal
revenue sharing programs was accompanied by stricter overall federal controls.36
By the end of President Carter's administration, a growing consensus developed that
federal programs were poorly managed and administered with too little
accountability.37 It was not until President Reagan's administration, when there was
stagnation in Washington but overall general governmental activism, that the
country experienced a major shift of power and responsibility from the federal
government to the states, counties and cities. The result was substantial cutbacks in
federal aid.3" At the same time, constituents, recognizing the futility of placing
34. See Alvin D. Lurie, Assistant Commissioner of the IRS for Employee Plans and Exempt Organizations,
Speech Before the Third Annual Conference of the National Association of Attorneys General Special Committee
on Charitable Trusts and Solicitations (Apr. 1975), in Lurie Calls for Cooperation with States in Regulating
Charitable Organizations, 43 J. TAx'N 58 (1975).
35. let; see also FILER COMM'N REsEARcH PAPERS RESEARcH PAPERS, supra note 3 (considering whether
the equity enforcement power reserved for the states should be transferred to the federal level). Assistant
Commissioner Lurie indicated in an interview that the IRS would find it useful if such equity power were given
to the Department of Treasury or to the IRS specifically because of the relative passivity of states' attorneys general
in charitable trust enforcement. See Abernathy & Saasta, supra note 33, at 33. Prior to 1969, the Department of
Treasury had proposed that equity power be shifted to the federal courts to be triggered by the IRS if an attorney
general failed to act to protect the public. See id.
36. See Lurie, supra note 34.
37. See John Herbers, The New Federalism:" Unplanne4 Innovative and Here to Stay, GOVERNING, Oct.
1987.
38. See id. at 28-34. For example, during the 1970s, the federal government had provided large amounts
of funding and grants aimed at nonprofit health care providers, but in the 1980s, federal funding was cut
dramatically. See KAREN DAVIS ETrAL, HEALTH CARE CosT CONTAINMENT 1-69 (1990); Nina J. Crirnm,
Evolutionary Forces: Changes in For-Profitand Not-For-ProfitHealth CareDelivery Structures;A Regeneration
of Tax Eexemption Standards, 37 B.C. L REv. 1, 18-21 (1995); Robert H. Lovic & Joanne Gentry, Health
Maintenance Organizations(HMOs)-A 15 Year Perspective, DIMENSIONS HEALTH CARE, Nov. 1984, at 1;
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demands on Washington, turned to the state and local governments. This political
movement pressured previously quiescent state, city and local governments into
financially supporting and involving themselves in new social and economic
programs. 39 There was a return to the ideals of federalism and its implementation,
with the state and local governments taking up the gauntlet-"a change that
promises to be both more profound and more permanent than most people have
recognized."''
Today's state and local governments, in exercising their sense of independence
from the federal government, seem to have been reassessing the roles and functions
of the nonprofit sector and of many of the organizations that comprise it.
Governments surely realize that when nonprofit tax-exemptions are eliminated, their
involvement in nonprofit organizations' operations has the potential to expand in
numerous ways. For example, the government could value the organization's
property for property tax purposes. The organization's failure to pay such taxes
might give rise to tax liens or tax foreclosures. In each of these situations, the
government would be directly involved in confrontations, conflicts and legal
processes.
It appears that the evaluation process of what is the proper relationship between
government and nonprofits has focused on a variety of considerations. These
include the jurisdictions' economic needs, reconsideration and redefinition of
current social needs of the constituent public, behaviors of nonprofit organizations,
public distrust of the organizations and of the IRS. It also includes the sheer growth
and visibility of the modern nonprofit sector.
II. ECONOMIC NEEDS OF JURISDICTIONS
Economic recessions have been no stranger to this country throughout its history,
even during the past twenty-five years. 4 Most recently, the recession of 1990-1991

Theresa McMahon, Fair Value? The Conversion of Nonprofit HMOs, 30 U.S.F. L REV. 355, 358 (1996).
Moreover, between 1980 and 1984, nonprofit organizations other than health care providers lost $4.5 billion
(26.7%) of their federal support, with social service, community development and educational organizations
particularly affected. See Lester Salamon, The Invisible Partnership:Government and the Nonprofit Sector, 1 BELL
ATLANTIC Q. 37, 42 (1984).
39. Funding of these programs was accomplished in part by state and local governments' raising new taxes,
primarily income taxes and user fees, even as California's Proposition 13 tax revolt took place. See Herbers, supra
note 38, at 32-34. Some commentators contend that while states' administrative abilities to tax and to spend have
increased, their actual capabilities to do so has declined. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 14, at 647, 648-49, 66465 (noting variations in tax rates and abilities of states to raise taxes and make expenditures).

40. Herbers, supra note 38, at 28-29, see also U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 14, at 364 (discussing
how states have gained preeminence relatively recently).
One arguably unintended impact of centralizing responsibility for social and economic programs in state
and local governmental units may be the reduction of a commitment to pluralistic viewpoints that decentralization
of responsibility encourages. See BRUCE HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAx-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 27 (6th ed. 1992);

Norman Fink, Taxation and Philanthropy-A 1976 Perspective, 3 J.C. & U.L 1, 1 (1976); William R. Ginsberg,
The Real Property Tax Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations:A Perspective,53 TEMP. L. Q. 291, 311 (1980)
(stating that the "exemption evidences a social and cultural commitment to a degree of decentralization and
autonomy not only in the provision of public goods and the performance of public services, but in the definition
of public function as well").
41. This nation's economy was beset by recessions in 1973-75, 1981-1982, and 1990-1991. See ROBERT
E. HAi, BOoMS AND RECESSIONS INANOISY ECONOMY 34 (1991); Ted J. Smith Ill & S. Robert Lichter, Lessons
in Mass Media Depiction of Economic ConditionsDuringa Recession, in LESSONS FROM THE RECESSION 11-45
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financially strained the treasuries of many state and local governments. During the
same time frame, some cities encountered tax base erosion as a result of the flight
of industry and residents to outlying areas.42 Many businesses moved operations
abroad to take advantage of lower labor costs and other financial economies, further
narrowing the tax bases of state and local governments.43 Many individuals and
groups felt that there were inequities in the system because property taxes were
falling on remaining citizens and businesses.' The issue of unfairness of tax burden
was heightened when tax-exempt nonprofit organizations appeared to use state and
local services to benefit persons well beyond local and/or state boundaries.4'
Overall, there was vocal public resistance to paying taxes.6

(Sarah S. King & Donald P. Cushman eds., 1997).
42. See McCord, supra note 9,at 57; supranote 7 (discussing movements of residents and businesses to
suburbs).
43. See Made Outside the U.S.A., J.BUS. STRATEGY, Nov./Dec. 1996 at 1;John Balzar, News Analysis:
ForSome, Tumult of 1996 Parallels1896's Gilded Age; Politics:Observers Point to Era's UnbridledCapitalism,
Rise of Populism, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1996, at Al, available in 1996 WL 5241760; Debby Garbato, Spartus
Shutting U.S. Plant to Cut Costs; Spartus Home Furnishing,66 HFD-THE WEEKLY HOME FURNISHINGS
NEWSPAPER 45 (1992); Lift Truck MaintenanceProgramPays Dividends: Inside Warehousing& Distribution;
A Special Section on IncreasingProductivity, 29 TRANSP. & DiSTR1B.60 (1988); Mel Mandell, Asia: Converting
Crisis to Opportunity,WORLD TRADE, Apr. 1998, at 36-39; David Orgel, U.S. InterliningCompanies Seeking Far
East Business, 23 DAILY NEWS RECORD 2 (1983); Tim Shorrock, NY Garment Firm Strike Highlights Conflict
Over Jobs, Union Labor, J. COMMERCE, June 10, 1994, at A10; Yvonne D. Sinakin, Early Involvement Making
A Global Connection, ELEc.BUYERS' NEws ExTRA-CONNEcroRs, Aug. 19, 1996 at S36; U.S. Bakers Find New
Markets; Includes Departmentof Commerce Statisticsfor DirectInvestments Abroad in FoodManufacturing, 71
MILLING & BAKING NEwS 26 (1996).
44. See William Glaberson, In Era of FiscalDamage Control, Cities Fight Idea of "Tax-exempt", N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 21, 1996, at Al, available in 1996 WL 7492679; Editorial, Leave Churches Untaxed, ROCKY MTN.
NEwS, Sept. 15, 1996, at 79A, available in 1996 WL 12346001; Donna Uquori, City Turns to Charityfor Help,
LA. TIMES, May 14, 1995, at A20, availablein 1995 WL 2046052; Editorial, TaxpayersDeserve a Break From
Churches, USA TODAY, Oct. 17, 1996, at AI4, availablein 1996 WL 2072406.
45. See L Richard Gabler & John F. Shannon, The Exemption of Religious, Educational,and Charitable
Institutionsfrom Property Taxation, in FILER COMM'N RESEARCH PAPERS RESEARCH PAPERS, supra note 3, at
2535, 2546-47; Rebecca S. Rudnick, State and Local Taxes on Nonprofit Organizations,22 CAP. U. L REv. 321,
336-37 (1993); Bradford H. Gray, Why Nonprofits? Hospitals and the Future of American Healthcare, 8
FRONTIERS HEALTH SERVs. MGMT. 3 (1992); Roger C. Nauert et aL., Hospitals FaceLoss of FederalTax-Exempt
Status, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., Sept. 1988, at 48, 50; Helena G. Rubenstein, Nonprofit Hospitals and the
FederalTax Exemption: A Fresh Prescription,7 HEALTH MATRIx 381 (1997). The Supreme Court recently struck
down a Maine property tax exemption because it favored institutions that served in-state residents. See Camps
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 (1997); Evelyn Brody, Hocking the Halo:
Implicationsof the Charities' Winning Briefs in Camps Newfound/Owatonna Inc., 20 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV.
31 (1998); Marlis L Carson, JusticesPonderNon-Profit'sPropertyTax Exemption Dispute, 73 TAx NOTES 126
(1996).
46. See PARRIS N. GLENDENING & MAVIS MANN REEVES, PRAGMATIC FEDERAUSM: AN
INTERGOVERNMENTAL VIEW OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 141-44 (1977); Ginsberg, supra note 40, at 294-95;

Stephen Hayward, Commentary, Annals of the Taxpayer Rebellion, WASHINGTON TIMES, June 27, 1998, at C3,
available in 1998 WL 3451587; Ralph Jimenez, ConservativesJoin the Fight vs. N.H. Tax Plan, BOSTON GLOBE,
June 6, 1998, at BI, available in 1998 WL 9137414; Vermont Officials Warn Towns They'll Regret Any Tax
Revolt, ALBANY TIMES UNION, May 22, 1998, at AS, availablein 1998 WL 7259904.
In 1978, Californians had voted for Proposition 13 in order to place a ceiling on residential property

taxes. Their taxes had risen quickly and significantly because inflation had increased the assessed value of homes.
Although taxpayers discovered that the California government's treasury expanded significantly as a result of the
higher property assessments, they found that they personally were hurt financially. Proposition 13 had a substantial
impact not only on California, but also across the nation. The same inflationary forces had affected property values,
assessments and taxes in other states, and taxpayer resistance to increased property taxes spread. See John
Wildermuth, Prop. 13: The People's Revolutionl1978 Tax Rebellion Turned Initiatives Into a Political
Powerhouse, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., May 20, 1998, at Al, available in 1998 WL 3914197.
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The financial stresses prompted state and local governments to seek new tax
revenue sources. Some state and local governments chose to increase taxes,
primarily income and sales taxes.47 Many jurisdictions instituted an alternative idea:
cash contributions known as "payments in lieu of taxes" or PILOTs. Organizations
or governmental units agree to make these payments to jurisdictions, often
conceptualized either as a substitute for property taxes or in payment for services
received, for items such as police, fire protection and garbage removal.4 PILOTs
can be paid by larger governmental bodies to smaller ones, by for-profit businesses
and by nonprofits in return for tax-favored treatment. 9 PILOTs may be based on an
organization's or government's ability to pay.5' Boston undertook the first major
organized effort to institute a systematic PILOT program involving nonprofit
property owners.5 As of 1997, 51% of Boston's property was exempt from taxation
and owners were encouraged to pay PILOTS.52 Harvard College was the first major
institutional university to formally agree to a PILOT plan. Harvard has made
payments to Cambridge since 1929. 5' As of 1990, Harvard paid Cambridge
approximately $1.1 million in PILOTs on tax-exempt property valued at $71
million.' Other higher education institutions have been approached by cities to pay
PILOTs, as well.55 It has been argued, however, that PILOTs "erode the value of tax
exemption. These alternatives would recover only a part of the revenues foregone
by tax exemption and would not constitute the equivalent of placing such

47. See Herbers, supra note 38, at 34 (stating that more than half of the states increased personal income
or sales taxes and most states increased user fees); Samuel Rosen, Letter to the Editor, Proposition13's Legacy,
LA. TIMES, June 7,1998, at B16, available in 1998 WL 2434854; Stephanie Simon, 20 Years Later,Prop.13 Still
Marks CaliforniaLife Government: It Reined in PropertyTax Structure But UnplannedConsequences-Good
and Bad-Are Legion, LA. TIMES, May 26,1998, at Al, availablein 1998 WL 2430968; Wildermuth, supra note
46, at Al; see also Kirk G. Siegel, Comment, Weighing the Costs and Benefits of Property Tax Exemption:
Nonprofit OrganizationLand Conservation,49 ME. L REV. 399, 399 n.I (1997) (reviewing the current pressures
on states because of tax issues).
48. See ALFRED BALK, THE FREE LUST. PROPERTY WrrHouT TAxES 119, app. at 170 (1971); The Taxexempt Status of Western PennsylvaniaHospitals: Basesfor Exemption; Implications of Change, [hereinafter
Western Pa. Hosps.], HEALTH POLICY INSTrTE, HPI SERVICES #16, Apr. 1990, at 37-38 (citing: H. Larkin,
FinancialSuccess May Invite Local Tax Scrutiny, Hosps., Oct. 5, 1988, at 30, 32); Gallagher, supranote 2, at 2829, 32-33; Dan Pelegnini, Hospital Tax Exemption: A MunicipalPerspective, 5 FRONTIERS OF HEALTH SERVS.
MGMr. 44-46 (1989); Caroline Abels, School Districts Try to Block New Tax Law, PriTrSBURGH POST-GAZETTE,
Dec. 19, 1997, at B4, available in 1997 WL 16586392; Dick Dawson, Expert Urges Against CanterburyWoods
Tax Break, BUFFALO NEWS, Dec. 10, 1997, at B4, available in 1996 WL 5885154; Franklin, supra note 6, at A25;
Glaberson, supranote 35, atAl; Richard Higgins, Tax Idea Angers Charities,FraminghamMay Ask for Property
Payments, BOSTON GLOBE, July 6, 1997, at WWI, availablein 1997 WL 6260387.
49. See Gallagher,supra note 2, at 28-29.
50. See Western Pa. Hosps., supra note 48, at 37-38.
51. See Gallagher, supra note 2, at 28.
52. See Western Pa.Hosps., supra note 48, at 37 (citing T. J. JANKOWSKI, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE TAXEXEMPT PROPERTY STEERING COMMrrTEEFOR FISCAL YEAR 1987).
53. See Gabler & Shannon, supra note 36,at 2560; Gallagher, supra note 2, at 28; Harvard Will Pay More
to CambridgeAccording to Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1990, at B9, availablein 1990 WL 2014106.
54. See Gallaher, supra note 2, at 28.
55. See Exemption Challenges Continue, STATE TAX TRENDS FOR NONPROFITS, 1990, at 6 (reporting
Pittsburgh's attempts to obtain PILOTs from University of Pittsburgh, Duquesne University and local colleges).
In 1990, Yale University agreed to pay the city of New Haven approximately $2.6 million, slightly under $1.6
million annually to be used for the fire department's budget, and a one-time payment of $1.1 million to turn two
streets into pedestrian walkways. See Yale Agrees to Pay New Haven for City Services, STATE TAX TRENDS FOR
NONPROFrrs, 1990, at 2. It also agreed to put its golf course back on the city's property tax assessment rolls. See
id.

Winter 1999]

CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS

institutions back on the property tax rolls. '56 Nevertheless, it is worth watching to
determine whether PILOTs are part of an effective solution to governments' tax
shortages.
The changed (and still evolving) world and national economies have encouraged
competitive or economic federalism--that is, federal, state and local governmental
units have tried to survive and to achieve heightened levels of potential efficiencies
and economic development. 57 Critical to these ambitions and to goals of
decentralized and independent self-governance by state and local governments has
been their ability to raise tax revenues. 5' Although the income tax is important to
most state and local governments 59, the property tax historically has been and
continues to be the single largest source of revenue for local governmental units.'
Even though these local jurisdictions depend on property taxes to meet their
financial obligations, 6' by comparison every state grants a property tax exemption
to various categories of nonprofit organizations within the independent sector.62

56. See Gabler & Shannon, supra note 45, at 2559-60.
57. See Herbers,supra note 38, at 34; Suellen M. Wolfe, MunicipalFinanceand the Commerce Clause:
Are User Fees the Next Target of the "Silver Bullet"?, 26 STETSON L REV. 727,728 (1997).
58. States' taxing power comes from residual powers not delegated to the federal government by the U.S.
Constitution nor prohibited thereby. See U.S. CONST. amend X. Limitations on states' taxing powers come from
three sources-the U.S. Constitution, states' laws, and political realities. See Glendening & Reeves, supra note 46,
at 139. Local governments have the least taxing powei of any governmental unit, which accounts for their
dependency on property tax to meet revenue needs. See id. at 140.
59. Most states impose an income tax on individuals and corporations (the notable exceptions include
Connecticut and Texas).
60. There are some interesting property tax statistics: (1) property tax revenue comprises approximately 75%
of all tax revenues received by local governments and slightly less than half of the revenues from all income
sources, including user fees and state payments received; (2) property taxes range from approximately 98% of
school tax revenue to about 52% of city tax revenue; (3) in the western states, property taxes account for
approximately 71% of all local revenues; and (4) in the New England states, they comprise 98% of all local
revenues. (States create classes for real property taxation, which sets the tax base for local property.) See GLENN
W. FISHER, THE WORST TAX? A HISTORY OF THE PROPERTY TAX INAMERICA 200-204 (1996) (citing U.S. BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF STATE AND LOCAL FINANCES, 1902-1953 (1955) and U.S. BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, GOVERNMENT FINANCE (various years)); see also HENRY J. AARON, WHO PAYS THE PROPERTY TAX?
A NEW VIEW 9-11 (1975); BENSON, supranote 26, at 72-73, 83; JENS PETER JENSEN, PROPERTY TAXATION INTHE
UNITED STATES 1 (1931); Peter Swords, CharitableReal Property Tax Exemptions in New York State: Menace
or Measure of Social Progress,B. ASS'N N.Y.C., 1981. at 24.
61. Local jurisdictions often depend on the property tax to finance schools as well as other local services.
See Lawrence Susskind & Cynthia Horton, Proposition2-1/2: The Response to Tax Restrictions in Massachusetts,
in RESTRICTIONS N LOCAL FINANcE 158, 164-65 (C. Lowell Harris ed., 1983); Sharon N. Humble, The Federal
Government's Machiavellian Impediment of the States' Collection of Property Taxes Through the FDIC's
Regulation at Failed FinancialInstitutions: Does the End Justify the Liens?, 25 ST. MARY'S LJ. 493, 499 (1993).
62. Historically many states have permitted tax exemptions, whether for income, property or sales tax, based
on a non-profit organization obtaining a tax exemption by the IRS. See James P. Buchele, Justifying Real Property
Tax Exemptions in Kansas, 27 WASHBURN LJ. 252 (1988); N. Keith Emge, Jr., Note, Nonprofit Hospitalsand the
State Tax Exemption:An Analysis of the Issues Since Utah County v. IntermountainHealth Care, Inc., 9 VA. TAX
REV. 599, 599 (1990); Ginsberg, supra, note 40, at 291; Nauert, supra note 45, at 52. The previously nearautomatic state grant has been curtailed in some states, and some states' laws regarding tax exemption now diverge
significantly from that of LR.C. § 501(c)(3). See John W. O'Donnell & James H. Taylor, The Bounds of Charity:
The CurrentStatus of the Hospital Property-TaxExemption, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 65 (1990); Margaret A. Potter
& Beaufort B. Longest, Jr., The Divergence of Federaland State Policies on the CharitableTax Exemption of
Nonprofit Hospitals, 19 J. HEALTH POL, POL'Y & L 393 (1994); Mark F. Baldwin, Legislatures, Agencies
Debating Whether Not-for-Profit HospitalsDeserve Their Tax-exempt Status, MODERN HEALTHCARE, May 22,
1987, at 34; David A. Hyman & T.J. McCarthy, PropertyTax Exemptions: Headedfor Extinction?, HEALTH
PROGRESS, Dec. 1988, at 32.
For example, the Texas legislature enacted new provisions significantly restricting the property tax

12

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol' 29

Today, property taxes are an insignificant source of revenue for most state
governments.63
The allowance of the property tax exemption (and other tax exemptions) to
nonprofit organizations is not sacrosanct; governmental units may circumscribe
them. It should be no surprise then that the nonprofit sector, which owns valuable
properties against which taxes can be assessed,' has been vulnerable to challenge

exemption for charitable nonprofit organizations and narrowly defining the terms "nonprofit hospital" and
"charitable" in connection with care for indigents. See Tax. CONST. art VIII, § 2(a)(1995); TEX. TAX CODE § 1.18
(West 1995); TEX. HEALTH & SAFELY CODE § 311.043 (West 1995). In other states, the judiciary has established
specific criteria, based on existing statutes, for the determination of whether hospitals are "charitable" and entitled
to some type of tax exemption. The Utah Supreme Court interpreted a clause in the Utah Constitution to require
that hospitals prove entitlement to a property tax exemption on an annual basis. See Utah County v. Intermountain
Health Care, Inc., 709 P.2d 265 (Utah 1985). Now, nonprofit hospitals in Utah must submit annual financial and
operating information for examination by county tax assessors to determine whether the hospitals satisfy the Utah
Supreme Court's multi-factor test of charitability and thus warrant tax exemption for the year. See infra notes 75-79
and accompanying text.
Only churches, nonprofit cemeteries, and charities are tax-exempt in all states and the District of
Columbia. Hospitals, healthcare institutions or educational institutions are not exempt in every state. See E. C.
LASHBROOKE, JR., TAX-EXEMPT ORGANrZATIONS 97-108 (1985). As of 1985, hospitals and healthcare institutions
were not specifically exempted (but could have been exempted under "charitable" category) by statute in Alabama,
Colorado, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington,
or Wisconsin. See id at 109-11. As of 1985, educational organizations were not specifically exempted by statute
in Iowa, Massachusetts, Oregon, Vermont, Virginia, or West Virginia. See id.; Gabler & Shannon, supra note 45,
at 2535; Charles T. Clotfelter, Tax-Induced Distortionsin the Voluntary Sector,39 CASE W. RES. L REV. 663, 678
(1988-89); Ginsberg, supra note 31, at 292; Rubenstein, supra note 45, at 381 n.5 (1997) (setting forth each state
statute regarding hospitals' tax exemption).
These state property tax exemptions usually do not mirror the federal income tax exemption, but rather
are covered by independent state statutes or constitutional provisions. In many states, such as New York, wholly
tax-exempt property includes charitable organizations. The availability of data on the value of wholly tax-exempt
property varies widely among the states. Few states are able to report the value of wholly exempt real property by
type of exemption. See U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, ASSESSED VALUATIONS FOR LOCAL
GENERAL PROPERTY TAXATION, CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS xi (1992). In 1995, of all taxable and exempt property
in New York, wholly exempt property accounted for approximately 21%. See N.Y. ST. OFFICE OF REAL PROPERTY
SERVS., ANNUAL REPORT 2 (1995).
Although significant amounts of foregone potential tax revenues are attributable to nonprofit charitable
organizations, comparatively, such potential revenues comprise but a small portion of all property tax uncollectible
by state and local governments as a result of exemptions. It was estimated that in 1977, approximately one-third
($15 billion of potential property taxes) of all property was tax-exempt and one-third ($5 billion in potential taxes)
of that exempt property (that is, one-ninth of all property) was attributable to private holdings whereas two-thirds
was attributable ($10 billion in foregone tax revenues or shifted to taxable properties) to government or government
affiliated holdings. See Gabler & Shannon, supra note 45, at 2535-41. In 1971, in New York, 30% of all real
property was exempt from property taxes, but two-thirds of the exempt property was government-owned. At the
same time, over 80% of all property in New York City was government-owned. See Ginsberg,supra note 40, at
298-99, 302 (providing information on statistics with respect to many states). See also CITY OF NEW YORK,
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE TAx COMMISSION FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1976-1977 30 (1977) (showing 83.6% of New
York City tax-exempt property as government-owned in 1977); Richard Higgins, supra note 48, at 1 (stating that
the largest holder of exempt property in Framingham, Massachusetts was the "town, followed by the state,
charitable institutions, churches, and schools").
63. See Fisher, supra note 60, at 200. By the beginning of this century, states had diversified their tax
systems and during the post-World War II period their dependence on property taxes declined. See id.
64. For example, in the District of Columbia, apart from non-taxable governmental property, the largest
portion of the tax breaks are attributable to universities, international concerns and other nonprofit organizations
that pay no income taxes, and in many cases pay no property taxes. The biggest private owners of tax-exempt
property are: George Washington University (assessed at over $600.7 million), World Bank (over $516.7 million),
Georgetown University (over $398.5 million) and Howard University (over $375.5 million). See Vise, supra note
1, at Al, A7. However, the value of untaxed property owned by nonprofit organizations is far lower than
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by financially strapped state and local governments. 65 Where nonprofits do not pay
property or other taxes or fees for services,' they may be considered a financial
drain on governmental resources. 67
Ill. DIRECTING EFFORTS AND FUNDS TO CHANGING SOCIAL NEEDS
A goal of encouraging certain socially desirable behavior by nonprofit
organizations in part may underlie fiscally stressed as well as financially secure
state and local governments' strategies to circumscribe tax exemptions for the
nonprofit sector through the development of entitlement criteria. Whether an
exemption is from payment of property, sales, or income taxes, entitlement
standards generally identify and reflect notions of what constitutes relevant socially
valuable services sufficient in quantity and/or quality to warrant tax advantaged
treatment. 69 A government's application of these entitlement standards to each
nonprofit organization to determine its deservedness of tax beneficial treatment
assures that public funds are guided and available only to those nonprofit

governmental property that is not subject to taxation.
65. See, e.g., Holy Spirit Ass'n v. Tax Comm'n, 438 N.Y.S.2d 521,531 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (stating that
the tax exemption statute should be "strictly construed" and "its application by municipalities should be consistent
with a legislative intent 'to stem the erosion of municipal tax bases by permitting local governments to terminate
exemptions for nonprofit organizations other than those conducted exclusively for religious, educational, charitable,
hospital or cemetery purposes"'), rev'd, 435 N.E.2d 662 (N.Y. 1982).
66. See supranotes 48-55 and accompanying text (discussing PILOTs).
67. Usually there also is a quid pro quo expectation that the nonprofit will provide social benefit
commensurate with their consumption of governmental services and taxes from which they are exempt. A perceived
insufficiency of furnishing social benefits may also make nonprofits targets for challenge by governmental units.
See WILLIAM J. STROUSE, A COST/BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF PROVIDING TAX-EXEMPT STATUS TO NON-PROFrr
HoSPITALS 3, 6, 15 (1997); Potter & Longest, supra note 62, at 398, 414-25; Dennis Zimmerman, Nonprofit
Organizations,Social Benefits, and Tax Policy, 44 NAT'L LAW J. 341,344-45 (1991); Berton, supranote 8, at Al.
68. See George T. Bell, Where Have All the CharitiesGone, or Have They?, 66 PA. BAR ASS'N Q. 168, 16869 (1995); Siegel, supra note 47, at 399, 401,405-06; Dolores Kong, States Eye Hospitals' Tax-Exempt Status,
BOSTON GLOBE, May 4, 1992, at 17, available in 1992 WL 4174277; Bill McAllister, N.Y. JudgePlaces Tobacco
Institute Under Controlof Receiver, WASHINGTON POST, May 3, 1998, at A13, available in 1998 WL 11578394;
see also Santa Catalina Island Conservancy v. County of Los Angeles, 126 Cal. App.3d 236 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982);
Yorgason v. County Bd. of Equalization of Salt Lake County ex reL Episcopal Management Corp., 714 P.2d 653,
658 (Utah 1986).
69. The notion that a tax exemption to nonprofit organizations constitutes an indirect governmental subsidy
has been both promoted and criticized by scholars, legislators, and courts. For example, a 1938 congressional report
stated:
[E]xemption from taxation of money or property devoted to charitable and other purposes is
based upon the theory that the Government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief
from financial burden which would otherwise have to be met by appropriations from public
funds, and by the benefits resulting from the promotion of the general welfare.
H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong. (1938); see also McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 456 (D.D.C. 1974)
("mhe Government relieves itself of the burden of meeting public needs which in the absence of charitable activity
would fall on the shoulders of the Government."); Boris L Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of
Nonprofit Organizationsfrom FederalIncome Taxation, 85 YALE L J. 299, 305 (1976); Note, Developments in
the Law-Nonprofit Corporations,105 HARV. L. REV. 1579, 1620-21 (1992).
Moreover, where a governmental unit statutorily provides a charitable deduction to persons who make
donations to "deserving" charitable organizations, the governmental unit amplifies the effect of encouraging
socially desirable behavior by institutions. Studies have shown that the availability of charitable deductions
encourages charitable donations. See BURTON A- WSBROD, Tm NONPROFIT ECONOMY 93-95 (1988) (discussing
studies and providing additional sources); CHARLES CLOTFELTER, FIDERAL TAX POLICY AND CHARITABLE GIVING
141 (1985) (noting lack of the tax exemption would decrease donations by 25%). To attract donations, charitable
organizations' behavior will comport with the standards required to satisfy the statutory requirements.
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organizations whose efforts are dedicated to and sufficiently comport with the
provision of socially valuable services.7' In this manner, the marketplace of services
and providers can be directly impacted. Thus, governmental strategies encompassed
in criteria for granting new or continued tax exemptions actively can create a useful
tool for the orchestration and development of new institutional behavior patterns
deemed important to meet current social needs.
Over the past two decades, numerous jurisdictions have re-examined their
entitlement criteria for exemption from property or income taxes. Re-examination
has been particularly visible with respect to health care institutions. Utah and
Pennsylvania provide two specific examples. In 1985, the Supreme Court of Utah
issued its opinion in Utah County v. IntermountainHealth Care,7 a case in which
state and local Utah tax authorities challenged the tax-exempt status of two
hospitals because the hospitals failed to provide uncompensated care to the sick.
Based upon state constitutional principles of charity, the court reasserted that
deservedness of the property tax exemption by nonprofit hospitals "exclusively"
organized and operated for charitable purposes requires:72
the contribution or dedication of something of value . . .to the common
good.... By exempting property used for charitable purposes, the constitutional

convention sought to encourage individual or group sacrifice for the welfare of
the community. An essential element of charity is an act of giving. A gift to the
community can be identified either by a substantial imbalance in the exchange
between the charity and the recipient of its services or in the lessening of a
government burden through the charity's operation."
The majority stated that six factors must be weighed in determining whether a
particular nonprofit uses its property exclusively for charitable purposes, the third
of which directly addresses the definition of charity:
(1) whether the stated purpose of the entity is to provide a significant service to
others without immediate expectation of material reward; (2) whether the entity
is supported, and to what extent, by donations and gifts; (3) whether the
recipients of the "charity" are required to pay for the assistance received, in
whole or in part; (4) whether the income received from all sources (gifts,

70. To compound this impact of directing funds to certain perceived social needs, if a tax-exempt
organization loses its exemption from income taxes, it no longer will qualify to receive charitable contributions.
Donors likely will terminate gifts to nonqualifying organizations and wil seek qualifying nonprofits in order to
receive the charitable contribution deduction on donations of assets. For example, if a governmental unit
significantly tightens the standards for tax exemption of organizations providing food for the poor but at the same
time liberalizes or does not adjust the standards for tax-exempt status of organizations providing housing for the
homeless, shifts in donations will result. The obvious recipients will be to the remaining tax-exempt organizations,
the greater number of which will be organizations providing housing for the homeless. See, e.g., Michele L
Robinson, Labor Pains,HEALTH SYmsM REv., July/Aug. 1996, at 18, 19; Lawrence W. Singer, The Conversion
Conundrum: The State and FederalResponse to Hospitals' Changes in CharitableStatus, 23 AM. J.L & MED.
221,230 (1997); Gene Steuerle, Just What Do Nonprofits Provide?, 19 EXEMPr ORG. TAX REV. 373, 274 (1998).
71. 709 P.2d 265 (Utah 1985).
72. See id at 269. The state's constitution provides that the property tax exemption is available to "property
owned by a nonprofit entity which is used exclusively for religious, charitable, or educational purposes." UTAH
CONST. art. XIII, § 2, 1 (2)(c) (1895, amended 1982). Thid same quoted language appears in Utah's code. See UTAH
CODE ANN. § 59-2-1101 (1997).
73. IntermountainHealth Care, 709 P.2d at 269 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
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donations, and payment from recipients) produces a "profit" to the entity in the
sense that the income exceeds operating and long-term maintenance expenses;
(5) whether the beneficiaries of the "charity" are restricted or unrestricted and,
if restricted, whether the restriction bears a reasonable relationship to the
entity's charitable objectives; and (6) whether dividends or some other form of
financial benefit, or assets upon dissolution, are available to private interests,
and whether the entity is organized and operated so that any commercial
74
activities are subordinate or incidental to charitable ones.
The court indicated two reasons for finding that the two hospitals did not provide
the constitutionally required gift to the community and did not deserve tax-exempt
status: (1) there was no relief of government burden because for-profit hospitals
provided the same health care services; and (2) the hospitals failed to show that they
were almsgivers or provided unpaid services because there was no substantial
imbalance demonstrated between the value of the services provided to beneficiaries
and payments received by the hospitals, apart from gifts, donations or
endowments." The court's majority focused in large part on the historical and
economic contexts of that which had been considered "charitable" for health care
organizations. Specifically, the majority opinion stated:
Because the "care of the sick" has traditionally been an activity regarded as
charitable in American law, and because the dissenting opinions rely upon
decisions from other jurisdictions that in turn incorporate unexamined
assumptions about the fundamental nature of hospital-based medical care, we
deem it important to scrutinize the contemporary social and economic context
of such care. We are convinced that traditional assumptions bear little
relationship to the economics of the medical-industrial complex of the 1980s.
Nonprofit hospitals were traditionally treated as tax-exempt charitable
institutions because, until late in the 19th century, they were true charities
providing custodial care for those who were both sick and poor. The hospitals'
income was derived largely or entirely from voluntary charitable donations, not
governmental subsidies, taxes, or patient fees. The function and status of
hospitals began to change in the late 19th century; the transformation was
substantially completed by the 1920s. "From charities, dependent on voluntary
gifts, [hospitals] developed into market institutions financed increasingly out of
payments from patients." The transformation was multidimensional: hospitals
were redefined from social welfare to medical treatment institutions; their
charitable foundation was replaced by a business basis; and their orientation
shifted to "professionals, and their patients" away from "patrons and the poor."
The magnitude and character of the change in hospital care is suggested by
a number of factors....

74. Id at 269-70. For a discussion of these factors and the Utah Supreme Court opinion, see, for example,
Jerry J. McCoy, Health Care and the Tax Law: Reorganizations, Structural Changes, and Other Contemporary
Problems of Tax-Exempt Hospitals, 44TH ANNuAL N.Y.U. TAX INsTrrE § 58.04 (1986), Phelon S. Rammell &
Robert J. Parsons, Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care: Utah's Unique Method for Determining Charitable
Property Tax Exemptions-A Review of its Mandate and Impact, 22 J. HEALTH & HosP. LAW 73, 77-80 (1989),
O'Donnell & Taylor, supra note 62, at 66, and Emge, supra note 62, at 618.
75. See Intermountain Health Care, 709 P.2d at 278.
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Also of considerable significance to our review is the increasing irrelevance
of the distinction between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals for purposes of
discovering the element of charity in their operations.76
While substantial changes in the nature of hospitals as health care providers had
occurred over the years, the population needing hospital care still encompassed
significant numbers of poor persons. As a means of declaring the then-current social
value of providing free health care to this group of individuals, the Supreme Court
of Utah asserted that Utah's constitutional provision must be heeded and must be
an essential part of the criteria for nonprofit hospitals to obtain or retain a property
tax exemption.
Subsequently, relying on language from court opinions, the Utah State Tax
Commission (Commission) issued elaborate standards for property tax exemptions
applicable to health care providers and other charitable organizations. 7 In doing so,
the Commission reconfirmed the Utah Supreme Court's vision of current social
needs by listing the same criteria for identifying "charitable purpose" generally78
and specifically it added standards for determining tax exemption entitlement by
health care providers.7 9 The Commission broadened the Utah Supreme Court's
definition of activities worthy of qualifying as a "gift" to the community by health
care providers to encourage certain behaviors in addition to the provision of free
health care. Standard V, applicable to health care providers, specifies that:
[t]he institution ... must establish that its total gift to the community exceeds
on an annual basis its property tax liability for that year. The Utah Supreme
Court has defined gift to the community as follows: "A gift to the community
can be identified either by a substantial imbalance in the exchange between the
charity and the recipient of its services or in the lessening of a government
burden through the charity's operation." Utah County v. Intermountain Health
Care Inc., 709 P.2d 265 (Utah 1985).
The following quantifiable activities and services are to be counted towards
the nonprofit entity's total gift to the community:
* Indigent care-The reasonable value of the hospital's unreimbursed care
to medically indigent patients. The term "medically indigent" refers generally
to patients who are financially unable to pay the cost of the care they
receive....
• Community education and service-The reasonable value of volunteer and
community service (including education and research) rendered for and by the
hospital or nursing home ....
" Medical discounts ....
* Donations of time ....

76. Id. at 270-71 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
77. See PROPERTY TAX Div., UTAH STATE TAX COMM'N, PROPERTY TAX ADMiN. STANDARDS OF PRACnCE,
[hereinafter STANDARDs OF PRACIE], NonprofitHospitaland Nursing Home CharitablePropertyTax Exenption
Standards,Appendix D, [hereinafter Nonprofit HospitalStandards], at 32 (unpublished) (specific standards for
hospitals and nursing homes); STANDARDS OF PRACICe, supra, 16 Nonprofit Entities:Religious, Charitableand
Educational [hereinafter Religious, Charitableand EducationalStandards]at 18 (standards applicable generally
to charitable organizations). The Utah Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the STANDARDS OF PRACTICE,
supra in Howell v. County Bd. ex rel. IHC Hosps., 881 P.2d 880 (Utah 1994).
78. Religious, Charitableand EducationalStandards,supranote 68, § 16.1, at 19.
79. Nonprofit Hospital Standards,supra note 77, at 32-36.
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* Donations of money ....
The institution's charitable gift to the community also includes the
community value, whether or not precisely quantifiable, of (a) the operation of
tertiary care units or other critical services or programs that may not otherwise
be offered to the community, or (b) the continued operation of hospitals where
revenues are insufficient to cover costs, such as a primary care hospital in a rural
community.8 °

Clearly, with this supplemental list of activities, the Commission was attempting to
orchestrate and foster new behavior patterns by new and established nonprofit
hospitals and nursing homes and even perhaps to discourage the conversion of
nonprofit hospitals to for-profit endeavors.
At approximately the same time as the Intermountain Health Care case, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Hospital Utilization Projectv. Commonwealth
(HUP), considered the appropriate standard to be applied in determining sales and
use tax exemption entitlement by a nonprofit provider of statistical analysis of
patient treatment and cost data. 8 The court determined that exemption depended
upon an organization's qualifying as a "purely public charity," as required by the
Pennsylvania Constitution.82 Although the term had not been defined "with

80. Nonprofit Hospital Standards, supra note 77,at 34-35. In addition to Standard V, other specific criteria
were established for health care related organizations, which in relevant part provide:
Standard I: The health care organization must be organized on a nonprofit basis to (i) provide
hospital or nursing home care; (ii) promote health care, or (iii) provide health related assistance
to the general public. On dissolution, the institution's assets must be distributable only for
exempt purposes under Utah law, or to the government for a public purpose.
None of the net earnings and no donations can inure to the benefit of private
Standard I1:
shareholders or other individuals, "as the private inurement standard has been interpreted under
Internal Revenue Code § 501(cX3) of the Internal Revenue Code." Comments: Compliance with
Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(3) creates a rebuttable presumption that NFP's operations are
reasonable....
Standard I:Provides for nondiscrimination clauses and open access policies.
Standard IV: The institution must... establish that its policies integrate and reflect the public
interest. A rebuttable presumption of compliance with this standard is assumed if it is shown
that (i) the institution's governing board has a broad based membership from the community
served by the institution, as required by federal tax law; (ii) the institution confers at least
annually with the county board of equalization or its designee concerning the community's
clinical hospital needs that might be appropriately addressed by the institution; and (iii) the
institution establishes and maintains a "charity plan" to ensure compliance with Standard Il and
Standard IV.
Comments: Judicial decisions on property tax exemptions highlight the importance of charitable
institutions contributing to the common good. In addition, the courts have indicated that
charitableness must require an element of "gift" and has stated that such a gift may be met
through the lessening of a governmental responsibility. Inmeeting this standard the membership
and operation of governing boards is [sic] important.... There should also be a showing that
exempt institutions seek to address the health care needs of the community.... Two important
points of caution: First, the term "community" may well be narrower or broader than an
individual county's geographic boundaries.... Second, all policy decisions relating to the
governance and operation of the institution are ultimately under the direction of the institution's
governing board....
Id.
81. See Hospital Utilization Project v. Commonwealth, 487 A.2d 1306 (Pa. 1985).
82. See id. at 1311-12 (stating that for purposes of the state tax exemption available to charitable
organizations, see 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7204 (West 1889), the concept of a purely public charity pursuant
to the Pennsylvania constitution controls, see PA.CONST. art. Vm,§ 2(a)(v), rather than the definition found in the
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exactness under Pennsylvania law," 3 the court found that for any nonprofit
organization to be considered a "purely public charity," and therefore entitled to tax
exemption, it must possess five characteristics: (1) it must advance a charitable
purpose; (2) it must donate or render gratuitously a substantial portion of its
services (provide a gift to the community); (3) it must benefit a substantial and
indefinite class of persons who are legitimate subjects of charity; (4) it must relieve
the government of some of its burden; and (5) it must operate entirely free from
private profit motive.8 ' The court found that the nonprofit organization failed all
five requirements."5 In commenting on the organization's failure to advance a
charitable purpose, the court asserted that the organization did not provide a gift for
general public use and was not charitable in the legal sense. 6 It failed to provide
gratuitous services since it charged all patients fees approximately equal to its actual
costs;87 it did not serve a legitimate class because it served a definite number of
hospitals and health care service facilities which "do not fall within the genre of the
poor, incapacitated, distressed or needy;"8 8 it did not relieve any government burden
because its services were not traditionally undertaken by government;8 9 and it did
not demonstrate that it operated entirely free of profit motive. 9°
Similar to the Utah Supreme Court, a the Pennsylvania Supreme Court asserted
the importance of perceived current social needs and a nonprofit's role in
addressing those social needs in order to be considered deserving of a sales and use
tax exemption.' Subsequently, the five HUP factors were applied to several
Pennsylvania hospitals to determine whether they qualified as "purely public
charities" entitled to property tax exemptions. 3 In each case, the characteristics
were applied narrowly and the property tax exemptions were denied, obviously
resulting in fewer tax-exempt hospitals. 94
In response to the HUP case, the Pennsylvania legislature considered it important
to clarify the standards required of a "purely public charity" worthy of tax
exemption. On November 26, 1997, the Pennsylvania governor signed into law the

administrative code of regulations, see 61 PA. CODE § 32.1 (1999)).
83. Id. at 1312. However, in making its list of the five relevant factors, the court drew upon a number of
previously decided cases including Appeal ofMarple Newtown School District,455 A2d 98 (Pa. 1982); Appeals
of Woods Schools, 178 A.2d 600 (Pa. 1962); In re Hill School, 87 A.2d 259 (Pa. 1952); YMCA of Germantown
v. Philadelphia.187 A.2d 204 (Pa. 1936).
84. See HUP, 487 A.2d at 1317.
85. See id. at 1317-18.
86. See id. at 1317.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 1317, n.10.
90. See id. at 1317-18.
91. See Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 709 P.2d 265 (Utah 1985).
92. See HUP, 487 A.2d at 1313-17.
93. See Pinnacle Health Hosps. v. Dauphin County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 708 A.2d 845 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1998); School Dist. of Erie v. Hamot Med. Ctr. of Erie, 602 A.2d 407 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992). Because the
property tax exemption is available only to charitable organizations and depends on a state constitutional provision,
see PA. CONST. art. 8, § (2)(a), the organization must be a "purely public charity." Id.
94. See Carolyn D. Wright, PennsylvaniaCourt's Decision in HospitalCases: Bad News, For Now, 19
EXEMPT ORG. TAx REv. 328, 328 (1998). In both PinnacleHealth Hospitals and Hamot Medical Center, the
Commonwealth Court determined that the hospitals failed to satisfy the fifth factor-the organization must operate
entirely free of a profit motive-established in HUP.
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Institutions of Purely Public Charity Act (IPPCA),95 which, although utilizing the
five HUP factors set forth in the 1985 case,96 like the standards established by the
Utah Commission, takes a broader approach to the definition of a "purely public
charity." Focusing on behavior considered to be a gift to the community, the
organization must donate or render gratuitously a substantial portion of its services,
which the organization is deemed to meet if it satisfies one of the seven following
objective tests:
(1)It has a written policy, that is publicized in reasonable manner, that no one
will be turned away because of inability to pay; it must provide uncompensated
goods or services of the greater of 75% of net operating income or 3%of total
operating expenses;
(2) it implemented a written policy and fee schedule for basing charges on
family income. At least 20% of those served must pay less than cost of services,
and at least 50% of that group must receive a reduction that is at least 10%
below cost. Below cost goods or services must be comparable to those provided
to persons paying more than cost, or no one can be charged more than cost;
(3) It provides free goods or services to at least 5%of persons receiving similar
goods or services;
(4) It provides either financial assistance or uncompensated goods and services
to at least 20% of those served, provided half of the subsidized group pays fees
of no more than 90% of cost;
(5) It provides uncompensated goods or services that in the aggregate equal 5%
of its costs of providing goods or services;
(6) If the institution is a qualifying organization, provides goods or services free
or at reduced rate to government agencies or individuals eligible for
governmental programs; or
(7) It engages in fund raising on behalf of or in making grants to other purely
public charities, to entities "similarly recognized by another state or foreign
jurisdiction," to qualifying religious organizations, or to government agencies 7
Moreover, the Pennsylvania legislature envisioned that the nonprofit organization
additionally and separately must relieve the government of a burden as a quid pro

95. Institutions of Purely Public Charity Act (IPPCA), Pub. L No. 508 (1997) (codified at 10 PA. STAT.
§§ 371-85 (1998)) (originating bill at 1997 Pa. H.R. 55, Pa. 81st Gen. Assembly (1997)).
96. Pursuant to the IPPCA, supra note 95, a "purely public charity" is one which, in addition to providing
gratuitous services, satisfies the following: (1) charitable purpose test--the entity is organized and operated
primarily for the relief of poverty; advancement and provision of education, including secondary education;
advancement of religion; prevention or treatment of disease or injury, governmental or municipal purposes; or
accomplishment of a purpose recognized as important and beneficial to the public and which advances social,
moral or physical objectives; (2) private profit motive-the organization is free from private profit motive if none
of the net earnings or donations inures to benefit of shareholders or other individuals as those standards are applied

under the Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(3)); the organization expends or reserves all revenue, including
contributions, inexcess of expenditures in furtherance of charitable purpose or to fund other institutions organized
and operated for charitable purpose and operate free of private profit motive; and the governing instruments bar
the use of surplus funds for private inurement of any person inevent the organization is sold or dissolved; (3)
charity to persons--benefit a substantial class of persons who are legitimate subjects of charity-This test requires
that beneficiaries be unable to provide themselves with what the institution provides and the class not
predetermined innumber, (4) government service-relieve the government of a burden; and (5)provide gratuitous
services. See idt (as codified at 10 PA. STAT. § 375).
97. Id. (as codified at 10 PA. STAT. § 375(D)(1)).
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quo for the indirect subsidy of tax exemption.98 Through its vision of how a
nonprofit organization may satisfy its obligation to relieve a governmental burden,
the legislature broadly defined public functions or services which are valued. To
this end, the legislature established the following standard:
The organization must satisfy one of the following tests in order to relieve the
government of a burden: (A) It provides a service to the public that the
government would otherwise be obliged to fund or to provide directly or
indirectly or to assure that a similar institution exists to provide the service; (B)
It provides services in furtherance of the organization's charitable purposes that
are either the responsibility of government by law or historically have been
assumed, offered or funded by government; (C) It receives payments for
services on a regular basis under government program that are less than full cost
of providing services; (D) It provides service to public that directly or indirectly
reduces dependence on government programs or relieves or lessens the burden
borne by government for the advancement of social, moral, educational, or
physical objectives; (E) It advances or promotes religion and is owned and
operated by a corporation or other entity as a religious ministry; or (F) It enters
into a voluntary agreement with local governments. 9
Both Utah's Commission and the Pennsylvania legislature constructed potentially
quantifiable measures for determining whether specific activities are sufficient to
constitute a "gift" of services. In doing so, these governmental bodies purposefully
circumscribed the exemption criteria but broadened their respective supreme courts'
more restrictive views. These intentional circumscriptions should prevent perceived
abuses, should reduce opportunities for tax revenue losses and should foster certain
patterns of socially desirable institutional behaviors by nonprofits to account for a
world of changing social needs, but should not discourage the existence and
possible growth of the nonprofits whose activities reflect those socially valued
goods and services."

98. See id (as codified at 10 PA. STAT. § 375(F)). This approach stands in contrast to the Utah State Tax
Commission's approach that incorporates the relief of government burden as a means of satisfying the "gift"
requirement. Regardless of the tact, the underlying notion is that charitable organizations which relieve the
government of a burden are providing essential public services that the governmental unit otherwise would be
responsible to deliver because the private market is not optimally delivering the services. In other words, the tax
exemption is considered to be a means (albeit arguably not an efficient one) of defining governmental or public
functions. According to this view, the government fosters worthy charitable purposes and organizations through
an indirect subsidy, the tax exemption. The relief of the government burden is considered a quid pro quo for the
tax exemption. See Ginsberg,supra note 40, at 311. For a discussion of the relief of government burden theory as
applied in the federal income tax context, see Bittker & Rahdert, supranote 69, at 305; Robert S. Bromberg, The
CharitableHospital,20 CATH. U. L REV. 237, 241-56 (1970); Nina J. Crimm, Developing an Explanationof the
FederalIncome Tax Exemption for CharitableOrganizations:A Theory of Risk Compensation, 50 FIA. L REV.
419, 429 n.34 (1998); Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The CharitableStatus of Nonprofit Hospitals: Toward
a Donative Theory of Tax Exemption, 66 WASH. L REV. 307, 332-84 (1991). See also supra note 53(discussing
the subsidy theory).
99. IPPCA, supranote 95 (as codified at 10 PA. STAT. § 375(F)) and accompanying text.
100. See Western Pa Hosps., supra note 48, at 18; Lucy Pantaleoni, Note, New York's Real Property Tax
Exemptionsfor Religious, Educational and CharitableInstitutions:A CriticalExamination, 44 ALBANY L REV.
488, 502-503 (1980).
The IRS and federal courts have also recognized charity as an evolving concept. See John P. Persons
et al., CriteriaFor Exemption Under Section 501(c)(3), in FILER COMM'N RESEARCH PAPERS, supra note 3, at
1909; Crimm, supra note 38, at 11-70.
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IV. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIORS
Strong deservedness and anti-abuse doctrines underlie tax exemptions for
nonprofit organizations. These policies demand that nonprofits significantly and
sufficiently contribute to societal needs-that is, for example, charitable
organizations must engage "exclusively" ' in charitable activities"o-eand in doing
so, they must refrain from competitive behavior with for-profit entities.103 When
nonprofits have failed these behavioral requisites, they have become targets for
challenge by state and local governments. 104
As society has evolved and as charitable segments within the nonprofit sector
have modernized, notions of the types of activities that constitute charity have
changed. The traditional perception of relief of the poor and distressed is viewed as
irrelevant, too narrow, or no longer necessarily applicable solely to charitable
nonprofit organizations.'0 5 For-profit entities are considered legitimate entrants in

101. The term "exclusively" is understood to mean "primarily." See, e.g., Hospital Utilization Project v.
Commonwealth, 487 A.2d 1306, 1315 (Pa. 1985) ("[A] 'purely public charity' does not cease to be such where it
receives some payment for its services ....); Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 709 P.2d 265, 269
(Utah 1985) (listing six factors to determine "exclusively").
102. Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code predicates the income tax exemption for charitable,
educational, and religious organizations on their being "exclusively" organized and operated for the performance
of behaviors consistent with those purposes. State and local tax exemptions have a similar requisite. See, e.g., I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3) (1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-52-421 (Michie 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-2-1101 (1997).
103. The concept of noncompetition with for-profit organizations is the same as the commerciality doctrine
that has been applied with respect to the federal income tax exemption for charitable, educational, religious and
other such organizations. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1802.1 (1997). There is a long line of case law and
literature covering the application of the commerciality doctrine to the federal income tax exemption. See Better
Bus. Bureau of Washington, D.C., Inc. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283-84 (1945); Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden
de Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578, 581-82 (1924); Sound Health Ass'n. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 158, 190 (1978);
B.S.W. Group v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 352, 358 (1978); James Bennett & Gabriel Rudney, A Comnmerciality Test
to Resolve the CommercialNonprofit Issue, 36 TAX NOTmS 1095 (1987); Crimm, supranote 38, at 35-38; Bruce
R. Hopkins, The Most ImportantConcept in the Law of Tax-Exempt OrganizationsToday: The Commerciality
Doctrine, 5 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 459 (1992).
The commerciality doctrine considers an activity conducted in a commercial manner to be inconsistent
with the furtherance of an exempt purpose and hence the activity is considered nonexempt. The courts generally
have viewed such activity from the perspective of the consumer and have suggested that if the activity cannot be
differentiated from that of a for-profit counterpart organization, the activity is considered commercial in nature.
See In re Evangelical Lutheran Samaritan Soc'y, 804 P.2d 299 (Idaho 1990); Institute of Gas Tech. v. Dept. of
Revenue, 683 N.W.2d 484 1l. App. Ct. 1997); Paper Mill Playhouse v. Millburn Township, 472 A.2d 517 (N.J.
1984); Princeton Univ. Press v. Princeton, 172 A.2s 420 (N.J. 1961); Koenig v. Jewish Child Care Ass'n, 487
N.Y.S.2d. 759 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985); Muskigum Watershed Conservancy Dist. v. Walton, 257 N.E.2d 240 (Ohio
1970).
104. See Berton, supra note 8, at Al; Elsa Brenner, The Fight Over Tax-Exempt Properties,N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 11, 1996, at WCI, available in 1996 WL 7518991; Joe Fahy, Anti-Tax Break Bill Worries Hospitals,
INDIANMOus NEwS, Jan. 30, 1995, at A6, availablein 1995 WL 3033055; Leave Churches Untaxed, supra note
44, at 79A; Ramsey & Shattuck, supra note 6, at 21; Edmund Sanders, Nonprofit Health Care Questioned:
Lawmakers Among Those Who Wonder IfltBenefits Public, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRiBUNE, Sept. 25, 1994, at I11,
available in 1994 WL 5421710.
105. The traditional perception in large measure stemmed from legal distinctions between the nonprofit and
the for-profit corporate forms. For-profit corporations, including hospitals, have an obligation to shareholders to
maximize profits, but profit maximization generally would be inconsistent with the provision of charity care
or below cost care would reduce profit potential. On the other hand, according to popular
because fanishing free
traditional notions (albeit incorrect because nonprofit corporations can make profits--called a surplus in traditional
accounting terms) nonprofit entities, including hospitals, are not supposed to generate profits. See Intermountain,
709 P.2d at 270-72. This perception in part stemmed from legal prohibitions that arise from the structure of
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this field of providing modem charitable activities. This new reality is especially
true with respect to health care providers.
The current expectation is that both nonprofit and for-profit hospitals will
provide some uncompensated care or charity care. 6 The studies are not entirely
consistent, but there are statistics to indicate that the overall actual level of demand
for "charity" care has diminished and that the uncompensated care provided by
nonprofit hospitals for the most part may not be substantially distinguishable from
that given by for-profit hospitals. 7 In large part this may be the result of changes

nonprofit entities-that is, the prohibition against: (a) raising capital by offering equity interests; (b) disbursement
of any revenues in excess of debt costs and production costs to members in the form of dividends, liquidated assets,
or otherwise; (c) payment of surplus revenues to managers in excess of reasonable salaries; and (d) violating
fiduciary duties to members and the public. People holding this view believe that nonprofit hospitals should be
altruistic in nature, thereby requiring of them the provision of charity care to the poor. Moreover, the traditional
perception is that the provision of charity care is a quid pro quo for the financial advantages provided by taxexempt status. See id at 268. Finally, although this view is changing or has changed, the common belief has been
that nonprofit hospitals are not business enterprises and therefore should not compete with one another nor with
for-profit hospitals for patients. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care,
53 AM. ECON. REV. 941 (1963); Carson W. Bays, Why Most Private Hospitals Are Nonprofit, 2 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS
& MGMT. 366, 367-73 (1983); Kenneth W. Clarkson, Some Implications of Property Rights in Hospital
Management, 15 J.L. & ECON. 363, 363-70 (1972); E.F. Fama & M.C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual
Claims, 26 J.L & ECON. 327 (1983); Richard W. Foster, Hospitals and the Choice of Organizational Form, 3 FIN.
ACCOUNTABIIJTY & MGMT. 343, 343-49 (1987); Bradford H. Gray & Walter J. McNerney, For-Profit Enterprise
in Health Care: The Institute of Medicine Study, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1523, 1524-25 (1986); Stanley B. Jones
et al., Competition or Conscience? Mixed-Mission Dilemmas of the Voluntary Hospital, 24 INQUIRY 110, 113-18
(1987) [Editor's Note: the health care journal, not the philosophy journal]; Theodore R. Marmor et al., A New Look
at Nonprofits: Health Care Policy in a Competitive Age, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 313, 315-17 (1986); Mark V. Pauly,
Nonprofit Firms in Medical Markets, AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS, May 1987, at 257-60; Mark Schlesinger
et al., Nonprofit and For-Profit Medical Care: Shifting Roles and Implications for Health Policy, 12 J. HEALTH
POL., POL'Y& L 427, 427-29 (1987). The role of churches and other non-health care charitable organizations in
furnishing a social safety net has also been questioned. See Pertman, supra note 8, at 1.
106. Numerous studies and articles have been produced concerning three issues: (a) finding a suitable
definition of "charity care" for nonprofit hospitals; (b) determining the appropriate amount of charity care to be
deserving of tax-exempt status; and (c) agreeing upon the means of measuring whether the obligation of providing
charity care has been satisfied. The debate is complicated by a disagreement over the definitions of key terms. Some
scholars have equated the terms "charity care" and "uncompensated care." Others have grouped "uncompensated
care" as a subset of the larger term "bad debt." Bad debt results from underpayment of hospital charges by
financially-able patients. The measurement of both terms has been determined to be imperfect because it is capable
of being both under-inclusive and over-inclusive. See Susan M. Sanders, Does Mission Really Matter? Measuring
and Examining Charity Care and Community Benefit in Nonprofit Hospitals, in HEALTH INSURANCE AND PUBLIC
POLICY 87-89 (M.K. Mills & R.H. Blank eds., 1992); Frank A. Sloan et al., Identifying the Issues: A Statistical
Profile, in UNCOMPENSATED HOSPITAL CARE: RIGHTS AND RESPONSBILITIES 16 (Frank A. Sloan et al. eds., 1986);
Barbara Arrington & Cynthia Carter Haddock, Who Really Profitsfrom Nonprofits?, 25 HEALTH SERv. RESEARCH
291 (1990); Gray & McNerney, supra note 105, at 1523; Regina E. Herzlinger, Letter to the Editor, Are Voluntary
Hospitals Caring for the Poor?, 319 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1485-86 (1988); Regina E. Herzlinger & William S.
Krasker, Who Profitsfrom Nonprofits?, HARv. BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1987, at 93; Lawrence S. Lewin et al., Setting
the Record Straight: The Provision of Uncompensated Care by Nonprofit Hospitals, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1212
(1988); Suzanne Mulstein, The Uninsured and the Financing of Uncompensated Care: Scope, Costs and Policy
Options, 21 INQUIRY 214 (1984); Uwe E. Reinhardt, Flawed Methods Cripple Study on Nonprofits, HOSPITALS,
Apr. 20, 1987, at 136; Susan M. Sanders, Measuring Charitable Contributions: Implications for the Nonprofit
Hospital's Tax-Exempt Status, 38 HOSP. & HEALTH SERv. ADMIN. 401 (1993); Bruce Steinwald & Duncan
Neuhauser, The Role of the Proprietary Hospital, 35 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 817 (1970). See generally INS'rrUTE
OF MEDICINE, FOR-PROFIT ENTERPRISE IN HEALTH CARE (1986).
107. See Stephen M. Shortell et al., The Effects ofHospital Ownership on Nontraditional Services, HEALTH
AFFAIRS, Winter 1986, at 101-102 (discussing system hospitals); Jay Woltson, Overcoming Challenges to TaxExempt Status, HEALTH CARE FIN. MGMT., Apr. 1996, at 58. Commentators and studies continue to differ: (a) on
the aggregate amount of charity care that nonprofit hospitals, as opposed to for-profit hospitals, provide; (b)
whether the poor actually receive charity care; (c) the characteristics of hospitals supplying the greatest amount of
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in Medicare, Medicaid and private insurance programs." s It has been suggested that
these programs may have reduced considerably the traditional role of nonprofit
hospitals, have lessened their important historical social benefit function, and have
enhanced competitiveness between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals. 9
In the process of nonprofit hospitals' becoming more competitive with for-profit
hospitals,"' public perception has evolved."' The public's attitude now appears to
functionally equate nonprofit and for-profit hospitals (and perhaps other nonprofit
and for-profit health care providers). This change may have been fueled in part by
the proliferation of mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures and conversions of
nonprofit hospitals, HMOs and other health care providers into for-profits."' As this
trend has occurred, the for-profit sector of health care providers has grown." 3 In
charity care; and (d) the impact of charity care on a hospital's efficiency or inefficiency. See UNITED STATES
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE: REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SELECT COMMIrEE
ON AGING, NONPROFrr HosPrrALs-BETTER STANDARDS NEEDED FOR TAX EXEMPTION 21-29 (1990); UNITED
STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE: REPORT TO THE HONORABLE SAM NUNN, UNITED STATES SENATE, PUBLIC
HOsPITALs: SALES LEAD TO BETTER FACLITIES BUT INCREASED PATIENT COSTS 38-49 (1986); Pearl Richardson,
CongressionalBudget Office Report, Health Care Trends and the Tax Treatment of Health Care Institutions, 10
EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 897,910-13 (1994); Kenneth E. Thorpe & Charles E. Phelps, The Social Role of Not-ForProfitOrganizations:Hospital Provisionof Charity Care,29 ECON. INQUIRY 472 (1991).
108. See Davis, supra note 38, at 10-103 (generally discussing medicare and medicaid programs); Strong
Cash Flow, Balance Sheet, Management,Key to CapitalNeeds, 39 J. HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. 48 (1985); What
Ails the HospitalManagers?, INS'mUrONAL INV., Nov. 1983 at 341; Bill Neikirk, Who Picks Up the Health Tab
the U.S. Dropped?,CHICAGO TRIBUNE, June 22, 1986, at 1, available in 1986 WL 2678391.
109. See Western Pa.Hosps., supra note 48, at 75-76; Cinmm, supranote 38, at 9-11; Gray, supra note 45,
at 3; Curt A. Kramer, Nonprofit Hospitals:A CharitableCause or an Unjustified Tax Subsidy?, 3 EXEMPT ORG.
TAX REV. 341, 349 (1998); Potter & Longest, supra note 62, at 415.
110. See James Brown, View From the Hills, 27 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN, 381 (1983); Joe Flower, Is the War
Between Investor-Owned Institutions and Not-For-ProfitsOver?, 40 HEALTHCARE FORUM J. 59 (1997); TJ.
Sullivan, A CriticalLook at Recent Developments in Tax-exempt Hospitals,23 J. HEALTH & HOSP. L 65 (1990);
Hal Bernton, Competition Therapy: The Nation'sLargest For-ProfitHospitalChain Takes on Alaska's Nonprofit
Health Care Giant,ANCHORAGE DAILY NEwS, Oct 8, 1995, at IC, availablein 1995 WL 14720976; Brad Smith,
Competition Reshapes Nonprofit Health Care, DENVER BUS. J., May 24, 1996, at 2C. See generally BRADFORD
H. GRAY, THE PROFIT MOTIVE AND PATIENT CARE: THE CHANGING ACCOUNTABILYY OF DOCTORS AND HOSPrTALS
(1991) (examining the growth of profit seeking in American health care and the re-engineering of nonprofit
hospitals in the image of for-profit counterparts). For a brief overview and background that led to the competition
among hospitals, see J. Michael Woolley, How HospitalsCompete: A Review of the Literature,2 U. FLA. J. L. &
PUB. POL'Y 57 (1988-1989).
111. See Reed Abelson, Suddenly Nonprofit Work Gets Profitable, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1998, at Al,
availablein 1998 WL 5404979; David R. Olmos, A Dose of Reality; GreedIs Among Woes HMO Clients Must
Contend With, Doctor Writes, LA. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1997, at D2, availablein 1997 WL 2242197.
112. See DOUGLAS M. MANCINO, TAXATION OF HOSPITALS AND HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS 11-1, -2
(1995 & Supp. 1997); John F. Coverdale, Preventing Insider Misappropriationof Not-For-ProfitHealth Care
ProviderAssets, 73 WASH. L REV. 1 (1998). In 1995, ColumbiatHCA acquired 33 formerly tax-exempt hospitals.
In 1996, 17 of Columbia/HCA's acquisitions or joint ventures involved tax-exempt hospitals; an additional 14
acquisitions were pending. See Bruce Japsen, Another Record Yearfor Dealmaking:Activity Among Medium-Size
Companies Fuels ContinuedDrive Toward Consolidation,MOD. HEALTHCARE, Dec. 23, 1996, at 37. In 1995, 48
nonprofit hospitals converted or planned to convert to for-profit status; this conversion trend seemingly slowed
slightly in 1996. See Demise of the Not-for-ProfitHas Been GreatlyExaggerated,MOD. HEALTHCARE, Dec. 23,
1996, at 35. As of 1996, one percent of all nonprofit hospitals had conveted to for-profit status and 33% of HMOs
had converted. See Bradford H. Gray, HMOS and Hospitals: What's at Stake?, 16 HEALTH AFFAIRs 29, 29-47
(1996).
113. See Angela Gonzales, Funding of For-Profit Hospices Questioned, BUS. J., Nov. 29, 1996, at 7;
HospitalMergers: For-ProfitVentures Generate Backlash, HEALTH LINE, Oct. 18, 1996, at 1; Monica Langley
and Anita Sharpe, Acute Reaction: As Big HospitalChains Take Over Nonprofits, A Backlash Is Growing, WALL
ST. J., Oct 18, 1996, at Al, availablein 1996 W.-WSJ 11802751; Todd Vamess et al., Med Students Stand Tall
for Patients,Notfor Profits:Maryland Committee is Formed to "Defend Healthcare", BALTIMORE SUN, Dec. 7,
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turn, this growth has provided clear evidence that health care can be a commercial,
competitive business." 4
The bottom line is that the public is less willing or is unable to distinguish
between many nonprofits and for-profits. The magnitude and sources of revenues
received by nonprofit organizations may contribute to this perception. It has been
asserted that:
Since 1975, nonprofits' revenues have climbed from 5.9% of the nation's
income to more than 10%. Indeed, revenue for nonprofits, including community
hospitals, service groups, educational institutions, Red Cross and elderly
housing, but not churches and private foundations, was less than $100 billion
back then, equal to what tax collectors gathered for local services. Now, those
nonprofits' revenues exceed a half-trillion [dollars]-$100 billion more than
local governments collect."'
Not only has the publicity of these occurrences and dollar figures been noticed by
the general public, it also has drawn the attention of interest groups and
politicians." This has led to changes in the political and regulatory climate for
nonprofit health care providers," 7 with greater efforts being expended on regulatory
and enforcement matters."' For example, conversions of nonprofit HMOs to forprofit status have drawn legislators' attention. Perceived abuses have engendered
new legislation and processes of notification and approval of the conversion by state
agencies." 9 Some states have virtually banned conversions by passing strict and
complicated disclosure requirements."° As of December 1997, eleven states and the
District of Columbia had enacted statutes to regulate nonprofit conversions to forprofits; ten states had such legislation pending and similar legislation was pending
before Congress; while in five 2states the governors had vetoed bills or such
measures had died in committee.1 '
The attorney general's responsibility for being the guardian for the welfare of
charitable organizations and their intended beneficiaries has been poorly executed
over the years. This may be attributable to personnel constraints, the stress of more
important duties, the lack of full information about nonprofit organizations within

1997, at 6F, available in 1997 WL 5543038 (stating that between 1990 and 1995, for-profit lMOs grew 15-fold
in market value and membership).
114. See Gray, supra note 45, at 3. See generally Gray, supra note 110 (generally examining the large and
growing role of profit seeking in the American health care sector). The same view might be held with respect to
other nonprofits.
115. Taxpayers Deserve a Breakfrom Churches, supra note 44, at 14A.
116. See Gray, supra note 45, at 3; Roy Whitehead, Jr. & James H. Packer IMI,
States React to Not-for-Profit
Hospital Conversions, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., Dec. 1997, at 58.
117. See Gallagher,supra note 2, at 25.
118. See supra note I and accompanying text; Cynthia Wallace, HMOs Converting to For-ProfitStatus
CouldFace More Rigorous Reviews, MoD. HEALTHCARE, Apr. 11, 1986, at 42; Roy Whitehead, Jr. et al., Avoiding
State Intervention in Not-For-Profit/For-ProfitAffiliations, HEALTHcARE FIN. MGMT., Dec. 1997, at 56-58
(indicating that attorneys general recently have intervened in transactions involving attempts by nonprofit health
care providers to convert to or transfer assets to for-profits health care organizations).
119. See, e.g., CAL HEALTH& SAFEY CoDE § 1399.72 (West Supp. 1997); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-20, 104
(1996).
120. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2801(aX4) (McKinney 1993). See Whltehead & Packer, supra note
116, at 58.
121. See id.
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his or her jurisdiction," political pressures that attach to the position as a political
officer and the infrequency of public complaints about particular nonprofit
organizations.' 3 Despite the fact that for many years neither attorneys general nor
other appropriate government officials have been able to aggressively or adequately
monitor nonprofit organizations, some states' attorneys general recently have
increased scrutiny of these organizations and transactions, in response to the new
health care environment of mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures and conversions.
These newly assumed duties include matters that had been, perhaps by personnel
necessity, primarily of concern to the IRS or the Department of Justice. Attorneys
general now have an interest, as parens patriae, in exercising their legal obligations
to protect fiduciary duty standards, to guard community benefit guidelines and to
defend against antitrust potential violations." This scrutiny is leading to more and
more litigation.'2 5 A current New York case, 126 involving an action with potential

122. In the early 1980s, officials from the Treasury Department, IRS, National Association of Attorneys
General, and the National Association of State Charity Officials revamped the Federal Return of Organization
Exempt from Income Tax, Form 990. As modified, the Form 990, filed annually with the IRS by nearly all
501(c)(3) organizations that are not private foundations, requires disclosure of financial information for
accountability purposes. Form 990 is considered by Treasury and the IRS as essential for federal tax purposes and
by state government officials as helpful in monitoring charities for obvious abuses and in regulating those charities
that solicit funds within a state. Currently most states require charitable organizations to file the Form 990, and
some states even require additional financial materials. See Peter Swords, The Form 990 As An Accountability Tool
for 501(c)(3) Nonprofits, 51 THE TAX lAWYER 571, 577 (1998) (questioning the adequacy and effectiveness of
the Form 990 as an accountability tool). New disclosure rules under I.R.C. § 6104(e) (as amended by Taxpayer Bill
of Rights 2, Pub. L No. 104-168, § 1313(a), 110 Stat. 1474 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.)),
require a federally tax-exempt organization to provide a copy of its Form 990 information return within 30 days
of a written request. This change is expected to "lead to greater interest by the public in the finances and activities
of exempt organizations." Fred Stokfeld, DisclosureRules Will Increase PublicInterest in Form 990, Owen Says,
21 EXEMpr ORG. TAX REV. 9 (1998) (paraphrasing IRS Exempt Organizations Division Director Marcus S. Owens'
comments at a Washington conference). The public's inspection may promote yet more interest in these
organizations by state tax authorities and attorneys general.
123. See Billitteri, supra note 1, at 34; George Gleason Bogert, Proposed Legislation Regarding State
Supervision of Charities, 52 MICH. L REV. 633, 634-35 (1954) (citing ELEANOR TAYLOR, PUBLC
ACcOUNTABmrY OF FOUNDATIONS AND CHARrrABLE TRuSTS 143 (1953); State Attorney General D'Amours, The
Control of Charitable Trusts by the Attorneys General, Address Before the Annual Meeting of the National
Association of Attorneys General (1986), in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATrORNEYS
GENERAL 98 (1946); State Regulation of CharitableTrusts and Solicitations,in THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
ATTORNEYS GENERAL COMMITIE ON THE OFFICE OF ATIORNEY GENERAL, Aug. 1977, at 3, 6-7; Justice Fred R.
Winans & Joseph G. Rimlinger, CharitableTrusts in South Dakota: Who Shall Supervise Their Trustees?,21 S.D.
L REv. 232, 238 (1976); State Attorney General O'Neill, Address Before Montgomery Bar Association (1953);
and sources cited supra note 3.
124. See, e.g., Kelley v. Michigan Affiliated Health Corp, No. 96-83848-CZ (Mich. Cir. Ct. filed Sept. 5,
1996) (sustaining the attorney general's challenge to block the merger of a nonprofit health care provider and
Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corporation on the grounds that the merger would violate fiduciary duties and betray
the charitable trust); State v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield Mutual of Ohio, No. 311632 (Ohio C.P. filed July 11,
1996) (dealing with issues of violation of fiduciary duty of officers and directors); Cynthia Wallace, supra note
118, at 42; Attorney General Dan Lungren, News Release, CAL. DEP'T OF JUST., Nov. 8, 1996 (warning that if a
proposed merger occured, an action against the directors would be brought). Even outside the confines of mergers,
acquisitions and conversions, attorneys general have increasingly monitored nonprofit health care organizations.
See, e.g., Attorney Gen. v. Hahnemann Hosp., 494 N.E. 2d 1011 (Mass. 1986) (scrutinizing nonprofit hospital's
expanded purpose under cy pres doctrine to determine if it still conformed to original purpose established in
charitable trust); Tennessee ex rel. Adventist Health Care Sys. v. Nashville Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 914 S.W.2d 903
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (denying injunction request to stop the sale of nonprofit to a for-profit hospital); Robert
Boisture & Douglas Varley, State Attorneys General'sLegal Authority to Police the Sale of Nonprofit Hospitals
and HMOs, 13 ExEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 227 (1996).
125.

See Allison Bell, New Jersey Blue Loses CharityStatus Battle, NAT'LUNDERwRIrER, Feb. 16, 1998,
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significant antitrust implications for hospital affiliations throughout the country,
may foreshadow what will happen in the future.
V. DISTRUST AND SCANDAL
A Spate of Charity Scandals Raises Questions About
the
Watch?...
"Asleep on
Watchdog Agencies" '27 captures the flavor of
of
Government
the Effectiveness
many recent article titles. Negative press about nonprofit organizations and their
fiduciary representatives-trustees, board members, officers and high-level
executives-has flourished during the last twenty-five years. As suggested by one
prior IRS official years ago, there are "a tremendous number of calls from reporters
who have unearthed scandals or things they call scandals, and very often they're
digging in the exempt organizations because exempt organizations are in a goldfish
bowl--the reporters can find out more about them than they can about corporations
or individuals."'" In recent years, the media has reported fraud and abuse charges,
such as misappropriation of funds. Salaries and benefits paid to officers and top
executives of charitable organizations and self-dealing abuses have attracted
newspaper coverage throughout the country. 29 Journalists reported that the
Christian Broadcasting Network and its head, Pat Robertson, used the
organization's money to promote Robertson's 1988 bid for the presidency. 3 °
Reports appeared about certain payments to John Silber, former president of Boston
University,"3 I and about excess compensation payments to and mismanagement by
Peter Diamandopoulos, former president of Adelphi University, 32 and William
at 2; CaliforniaAttorney General Opposes Sharp HospitalDeal with ColumbiaHCA, HEALTH LAW REP. (BNA)
No. 45, at 1668 (Nov. 14, 1996).
126. See New York v. Saint Francis Hospital, No. 98-0939 (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 10, 1998) (hearing
allegations by the New York attorney general of illegal price fixing and market allocation by two hospitals). New
York, along with Massachusetts and Connecticut, are generally considered some of the most active states for
purposes of monitoring and regulating charitable organizations.
127. Elizabeth Greene & Grant Wiiams,Asleep on the Watch?... A Spate of Charity Scandals Raises
Questions About the Effectiveness of Government Watchdog Agencies, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, July 27, 1995,
at I (discussing the "Ponzi"-type scheme of the Foundation for New Era Philanthropy debacle, the NAACP abuses
and the United Way scandal).
128. Abernathy & Saasta, supranote 33, at 35.
129. See Susan Gray & Elizabeth Greene, Big Salaries Just Keep Going Up-Major CharitableGroups
Continue to Pay Well to Lure Top Erecutives in Spite of Scandal and Scrutiny, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Sept. 7,
1995, at1; Douglas Lederman, PrivateColleges' Pay:A "Chronicle" Survey, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 29,
1995, at A23.
130. See Christian BroadcastingNetwork, IRS Reach Settlement, 78 TAX NOTES 1598 (1998); Thomas B.
Edsall, ChristianNetwork to Pay IRS Fine; Millions Were Spent to Promote Pat Robertson's '88 Campaign,
WASHINGTON POST,Mar. 21, 1998, at Al, availablein 1998 WL 2474320; David Stout, ChristianBroadcasting
Network to Pay Finefor Its PoliticalEfforts in 1988, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1998, at Al, availablein 1998 WL
5402915.
131. See Stephen Kurkjian, '90 Silber IRS Filing Cites Additional Tax, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 12, 1993, at
27, available in 1993 WL 6575943; Presidents' Pay at Private Universities, CHRON. HIGHER EDuc., Sept. 29,
1995, at I(reporting Silbe's pay and benefits in 1993-1994 at $564,020, purportedly the highest pay provided at
universities participating in survey); Wayne Woodlief, Silber to Reveal Tomorrow ifHe'd Face Weld Again,
BOSTON HERALD, Jan. 18, 1994, at 16, availablein 1994 WL 5377579.
132. See Greene & Williams, supra note 127, at 1; William H. Honan, Best-Paid College Leader is At
Northeastern U., N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 19, 1997, at 3, available in 1997 WL 8007886; Bruce Lambert, State Sues to
Recover Funds Spent byAdelphi's Ex-Trstees, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1997, at BI, availablein 1998 WL 7989918
(also discussing the mismanagement by Adelphi trustees); Scot Lehigh, Living with a Lot, Living with a Little,
BOSTON GLOBE, July 9, 1997, at D3, availablein 1997 WL 6260573; Ousted Adelphi Leaders Lose Preliminary
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Aramony, former president of the United Way.' 33 Embezzlement and fraud
involving millions of dollars were reportedly perpetrated on Goodwill Industries.' 34
The use of for-profit subsidiaries by nonprofit organizations' fiduciary
representatives as a means of splitting their compensation packages between forprofits and nonprofits to avoid disclosure problems has been recounted in the
media.'35 Although it is known that the vast majority of nonprofit organizations and
their fiduciary representatives engage in appropriate and honest dealings, these and
other widely publicized abuses thrust the independent sector into the public
limelight. It is only natural that these reports would inflame citizens who would
pressure state attorneys general to subject nonprofit organizations to more critical
scrutiny.
Granted, the behaviors of individual nonprofit institutions, their fiduciary
representatives, and the independent sector have triggered renewed public activism
and awareness by attorneys general. The behavior of the IRS also has contributed
to the heightened interest. The IRS has come under visible scrutiny by politicians,
the media and the public for alleged mishandling of taxpayer matters. In September
1997, public hearings were held before the Senate Finance Committee in which
tales of IRS perceived abuses were told by taxpayers.' 36 In response, in October
1997, Congressman Bill Archer introduced a bill calling for the restructuring of the
IRS.37 More hearings were held in 1998 before the Senate Finance Committee
during which IRS problems were described further. 3 ' The House and Senate have
since passed the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998,

Rulings, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1998, at B5, available in 1998 WL 5406924.
133. See Editorial, Aramony's Fraud on United Way, ATLANTA CONSTrrUTION, Apr. 6, 1995, at A14,
available in 1995 WL 6511912; Andrew Glass, Editorial, Arwnony Let Down the Needy, ATLANTA CONSTIUTION,
Mar. 7, 1992, at A19, available in 1992 WL 4577250; United Way Chief Quits Among Scandal, CHICAGO SUNTMNEs, Feb. 28, 1992, at 6, available in 1992 WL 3452406; Editorial, United Way: Leaner and Needier, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 17, 1992, at A34, available in 1992 WL 2071907; Voices: Would You Give to United Way? Or Are
There Better Ways to Give?, USA TODAY, Apr. 5, 1995, at A8, available in 1995 WL 2934059.
134. See Thomas J. BilHitteri, Goodwill Looting: California Scam Yields Lessons for Charity Managers,
CHRON. PHnANTHRopy, Feb. 12, 1998, at 39.
135. See Reed Abelson, Charities Use For-Profit Units to Avoid Disclosing Finances, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9,
1998, at Al, available in 1998 WL 5397459 (giving information on such charities as Minnesota Public Radio, Feed
the Children, and the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation).
136. See Hearings on the IRS Before the Senate Fin. Comm, 105th Cong. (Sept. 24, 1997), available in
1997 WL 591242 (taxpayer testimony); Hearings on the IRS Before the Senate Fin. Comm., 105th Cong. (Sept.
25, 1997), available in 1997 WL 594068 and 1997 WL 603244 (IRS workers testified about the ills in the IRS).
137. See H. R. Rep. No. 105-599 (1998) (reporting on Archer's bill, H.R. 2676, 105th Cong. (1998)
(enacted), entitled Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998) [hereinafter IRS Restructuring
Act]. The IRS Restructuring Act contains numerous provisions relevant to the oversight and restructuring of the
IRS. It creates an outside board to oversee the IRS and the strengthening of taxpayers' rights. This board (composed
of eleven members with eight of them being private citizens), without having the right to establish tax policy, has
the right to submit an annual budget request to Congress on behalf of the IRS and to approve the IRS's strategic
plans, the IRS's operations and performance of senior managers, and major reorganization of the IRS. Numerous
changes were made with respect to taxpayer rights (this portion is known as the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 3). Among
the major modifications of the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 3 are the shifting of the burden of proof to the IRS in tax
matters in controversy before the United States Tax Courts, relief for innocent spouses, protections for taxpayers
subject to audit or collection and the establishment of an easier means by which taxpayers may recover legal costs
in cases where the IRS is found incorect and by which taxpayers may win damages when the IRS is found to have
acted negligently.
138. See Hearings on the IRS Before the Senate Fin. Comn, 105th Cong. (Apr. 30, 1998), available in 1998
WL 219882.
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and President Clinton signed it into law.' 39 IRS Commissioner Charles Rossotti is
designing and implementing plans for drastic structural changes for the agency."4
During this same general time period, the media carried other news stories that
reflected poorly on the IRS. Newspaper reports told of the IRS's landmark reversal
of its previous decision that the Church of Scientology was a commercial enterprise
and did not deserve tax-exempt status. 4 The reversal granted tax-exempt status to
over one hundred Church of Scientology-related entities, including the mother
church. Moreover, the IRS agreed to stop auditing a number of the church's major
organizations and to drop attempts to obtain certain church records. This and other
concessions by the IRS were made after the Church of Scientology agreed to pay
the federal government $12.5 million, which was intended to cover the church's
payroll, income and estate tax bills for an undisclosed number of years prior to
1993.142 Many experts in the tax community reeled. German government officials,
whom the Church of Scientology had been pressing for tax-exempt status and had
accused of harassment and discrimination, responded that "Scientology was not a
church worthy of tax exemption, but a commercial enterprise." 43
The IRS repeatedly has been criticized and discredited in the media by politicians
and the general public. It is possible that a sense of distrust has resulted, heightening
state authorities' alertness to matters previously entrusted to the IRS. Thus, for
issues involving the tax-exempt status of a nonprofit organization, the states now
might be reticent to rely exclusively on the IRS's judgment, findings and processes.
VI. GROWTH OF NONPROFIT SECTOR
Nonprofits may be triggering the attention of the attorneys general and state and
local tax authorities for another straightforward reason: the sheer size and dramatic
growth of the nonprofit sector during the past several decades. There were 806,375
nonprofit organizations that were tax-exempt under the Internal Revenue Code in
1978, and by 1992, there were over one million. 144 Between 1975 and 1990, the
assets of these tax-exempt organizations rose over 150% in real terms and their
revenues grew over 225% to approximately $560 billion. 45 As of 1990, tax-exempt
organizations accounted for approximately 10% of the country's gross domestic

139. See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L 105-206, 112 Stat. 685
(1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 23, 26, 38 U.S.C.).
140. See Tracey L Miller, Rossotti Unveils Planto Overhaul, Cut IRS, 12 ACCOUNTING TODAY 1 (1988).
141. See Douglas Frantz,Scientology's Puzzling Journey From Tax Rebel to Tax-Exempt, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
9, 1997, at Al, available in 1997 WL7987286; Douglas Frantz, $12.5 Million Deal With I.R.S. Lifted Cloud Over
Scientologists, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1997, at Al, available in 1997 WL 17837815; Elizabeth MacDonald,
Scientologists and IRS Settled for $12.5 Million: Accord in 1993 Also Calledfor Church to Set Up Tax
Compliance Panel, WAL ST. J., Dec. 30, 1997, at AI2,available in 1997 WL-WSJ 14179025; Scientology
Agreement with IRS Comes to Light, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Jan. 15, 1998, at 47.
142. See Frantz, $12.5 Million Deal, supra note 141, at Al; MacDonald, supra note 141, at A12.
143. Frantz, Scientology's Puzzling Journey, supra note 141, at A30; Frantz, Scientology's Star Roster

Enhances Image, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1998, at Al,A13, available in 1998 WL 5397736.
144.

See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE BRIEFING REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL

REQUESTERS, TAX-EXEMPT ORGANrZATIONs-N ORMATION ON SELECrE TYPES OF ORGANIZATIONs 8-9 (1995),
available in 1995 WL 237385. The I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organizations are the largest category of tax-exempts. See
id. In 1990, of a total of 1,022,223 tax-exempt organizations, 489,891 were I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) charities. See id.
145. See id.
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product, up from close to 6% in 1975. " In 1995, the nation's 1.1 million taxexempt nonprofits generated approximately $1.1 trillion in revenues and controlled
$1.475 trillion in assets.'47 By 1996, these tax-exempt organizations had revenues
of $621.4 billion, up from $111.1 billion in 1977.'1 These dramatic changes have
profoundly increased the visibility of the nonprofit sector in this country, and as
with many visible and apparently productive industries in the American economy,
scrutiny has followed.
CONCLUSION
Numerous economic and non-economic considerations account for the
heightened attention state and local governmental officials have showered on
nonprofit organizations during the last twenty-five years. These have included: (a)
the increased size and visibility of the nonprofit sector; (b) a revitalization of
federalism; (c) a search for new tax revenue sources by financially needy
jurisdictions which have been subjected to recessionary stresses and tax base
erosion; (d) the passage and implementation of regulatory and legislative initiatives
to direct efforts and funds to changing social needs; (e) the perception that some
charitable organizations' behavior demonstrates unworthiness of tax-exempt status
or suggests abuse of fiduciary duties by directors and officers; and (f) a discomfort
with reliance on monitoring of nonprofit entities by the federal government,
particularly by the IRS.
The amount of attention may continue at its current level or increase. In the last
several years, a number of steps have been taken by the states' courts and
legislatures to enhance the monitoring functions of charitable organizations. For
example, as a result of a growing trend of fraud in the solicitation of charitable
donations, many states and localities have passed legislation that regulates
149
solicitation by requiring registration of solicitors and filing of reports. Moreover,
the federal government recently has increased the likelihood of greater state-federal
cooperation with respect to monitoring charitable organizations. Congress enacted
°
an amendment to the I.R.C. § 6104(e) disclosure rules," and added I.R.C. § 4958
intermediate sanction rules.' Both may strengthen states' monitoring of charitable
146. See id I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organizations accounted for approximately seven percent of gross domestic
product in 1990. See id.
147. See Edward T. Pound et al., Tax-exempt!, U.S. NEWS & WoRD REP., Oct. 2, 1995, at 36,51, available
in 1995 WL 3114545.
148. See AMERICA'S NONPROFrr SECTOR: FACTS AND FIGURES ON THE INDEPENDENT SECTOR 1977-1996

(published pamphlet with fact sheet showing preliminary figures on 1996).
149. See Fishman & Schwarz, supra note 3, at 260-306; Lyon, supra note 3.at 5-37 to -38. The U.S.
Supreme Court has limited some of these regulations on charitable solicitations. See Village of Schaumburg v.
Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980) (holding unconstitutional an ordinance prohibiting home
solicitation by those organizations who were not using seventy-five percent of the receipts for charitable purposes);
Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988) (holding unconstitutional a state law requiring licensing
and disclosure by organizations who are soliciting). However, state laws regulating solicitation are not uniform,
nor is there a model code or standard that applies to intesjurisdictional solicitations over the internet.
150. See supra note 122.
151. The IRS now has the ability to impose sanctions, via a penalty tax, on disqualified persons and
foundation managers of charitable organizations who engage in excess benefit transactions with LR.C. § 501 (c)(3)
and (c)(4) organizations, without being forced to take either extreme position of revocation of the organizations'
tax exemption status or sitting idle. See I.R.C. § 4958 (1994) (amended 1995).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

organizations through the sharing of significant information. Additionally, state
attorneys general might be in a position to trust the reformed IRS to a greater extent
in the future. As a result of the enactment of the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act
of 1998, immediate steps are planned to correct perceived problems that have
dishonored the IRS and to instill a greater sense of trust in that agency.'52 Finally,
for the moment, the bullish stock market in this country has enhanced the financial
well-being of many states, which may in part mean that they will find funds to
adequately staff the offices of attorneys general and to support the monitoring of
charitable organizations. With these and other such forces as public pressure, there
is little, if nothing, to suggest that state and local tax authorities and attorneys
general will be quiescent in the near future.

152. See supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.

